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ABSTRACT 
 
Ideas of lean satellite programs are still at an early stage of development and data on 
their actual management, development, testing strategy, and/or achieved outcomes are 
scarce if not non-existent. 
For a part of the space community, lean satellite programs represent the possibility of 
building a satellite despite lack of resources; and hope, through successful achievement, 
to be recognized as a positive contributor to space science, technology, engineering, and 
applications. For another part, lean satellite programs represent the black sheep of 
satellites engineering in the sense that they have the highest rate of infant mortality and 
mission failure, and a non-functional satellite is another space debris. 
High rate of infant mortality and mission failure of lean satellites tend to point out 
that ground based testing is not carried out optimally or sufficiently. Currently, work to 
define an adapted testing strategy for lean satellites is undergoing through the 
establishment of ISO19683 and HORYU-IV testing strategy was established based on it. 
Experimental data show that most failures are discovered during the early stage of 
the assembly, integration, and testing (AIT) processes. The results also show the 
importance of interfaces verifications. HORYU-IV failures taxonomy is also presented. 
Simulations were also carried out. Simulations results show that drastically 
increasing the initial AIT processes time does not drastically increase system’s 
reliability, but does drastically increase cost by more than 80% for HORYU-IV case.  
The research outcomes are intended to be used as guidance by lean satellite program 
developers and managers for better planning of AIT processes and resources allocation 
in order to develop more reliable, and therefore more sustainable, lean satellite systems. 
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction 
 
From a search on ScienceDirect, which gathers over 14 million publications from 
more than 3,800 journals and 35,000 books [1], it appears that only 67 results are found 
when searching for “small satellite and reliability” key words. From these, only 9 results 
are actually relevant in the sense they deal with the overall satellite project reliability 
and not just one of the sub-systems reliability, for instance. Similarly, when searching 
for “small satellite and cost” key words, 112 results can be found, but only 5 are 
actually relevant. Finally, when searching for “small satellite and schedule” key words, 
49 results can be found from which only 8 are actually relevant. 
Paradoxically, “small satellites” are being developed since the beginning of the space 
era with the launch of the “small satellite” Sputnik I in 1957, and Wertz [2] estimated 
that “historically, about 20% of all satellites launched are less than 400kg”. Yet, 
information on “small satellites” programs including cost, schedule, and reliability is 
extremely scarce. 
Since nearly a decade, the demand for “small satellites” is growing [3]; however, it 
was shown in [4] that their infant mortality rate is the highest among all satellite 
categories considered. This means that they are most likely to become non-operational 
soon after their insertion in orbit and consequently become space debris. This is not 
desirable for a sustainable use of space. Moreover, a high rate of infant mortality points 
out that testing prior to launch is insufficient. The reader shall note that in this research, 
“testing” is equally used to refer to “assembly, integration, and testing (AIT) processes”. 
The lack of testing of “small satellites” prior to launch can either be linked to lack of 
funds, time, knowledge, or development philosophy, and it all impacts the reliability of 
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the satellite after launch. 
Another problem to be addressed is regarding the terminology for the definition of 
non-traditional satellites. Throughout the world, a large portion of the space community 
uses “small satellites” to refer to non-traditional satellites. This terminology therefore 
limits non-traditional satellites to a certain mass, size, and/or volume. Yet, depending on 
the entities, countries, or even decades considered, different definitions of the values for 
the mass, size, and/or volume can be found. There is therefore no standard definition on 
what the mass, size, and/or volume of these so-called “small satellites” should be. 
Moreover, defining non-traditional satellites by their mass, size, and/or volume is 
reductive of their capabilities. The terminology “lean satellite” is thus introduced to 
refer to non-traditional satellites, i.e., satellites developed in a fast and low cost manner 
regardless of their mass, size, and/or volume. 
From the problems addressed above, it is clear that there is a need for more studies 
addressing non-traditional satellite programs, namely “lean satellite programs”, taking 
into account how these programs’ schedule, cost, and reliability can be affected 
depending on the selected AIT strategy prior to launch. This dissertation is the first 
study on this topic and it aims at guiding current and future “lean satellite” developers 
to help them optimizing their decisions for the improvement of their programs’ 
reliability and/or cost and/or schedule depending on their resources, requirements, and 
desired objectives. 
It should be noted that throughout this dissertation, the terminology “lean satellite” is 
always used to refer to non-traditional satellite programs except when referring to other 
studies, in which case the terminology as adopted in the considered study is used. 
For the achievement of the aforementioned aim, the research was separated into a 
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two-step action plan. The first step consisted in using HORYU-IV project to gather, 
during AIT phases, actual data on the number of failures, occurrence of failures, and 
type of failures. In this research, failure is defined as any mistake, malfunction, anomaly, 
or glitch in the hardware or software, such as misplaced hole, power line inversion, 
component short-circuit, and others. The data were collected for about one year and 
from them, the relation between the cumulative number of failures and the cumulative 
AIT processes time were studied as well as the time between failures, system reliability 
evolution, and failures taxonomy. The second step consisted in carrying out simulations 
based on reliability engineering as applied to satellite systems. From the simulations, 
failures mode and failures criticality could be simulated and their effect on total AIT 
schedule, project overall schedule, and satellite reliability after launch were studied. 
Finally, based on HORYU-IV financial data and simulations results, the evolution of 
cost over the different AIT phases and over the overall project schedule was studied. 
 
From this two-step action plan, there are three main objectives the research attempts 
to achieve. 
1) Demonstrate lean satellites reliability improves through AIT processes, even 
under harsh program limitations. 
2) Study the relations between AIT processes time, reliability, project schedule, and 
cost. 
3) Serve as a guidance to future lean satellite programs developers and managers. 
 
For the report of the research, the dissertation was separated into six chapters. In this 
first chapter, the problems to be addressed, the overall research goal, and the research 
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methodology were introduced. In the second chapter, background and literature relevant 
to the research are detailed. In the third chapter, the methodology for the experimental 
data collection and for the simulations is described. In the fourth chapter, results and 
discussion on collected experimental data and simulations are presented. In the fifth 
chapter, the research outlook, including the current research limitations and 
countermeasures as well as a practical application of the outcomes of this research, is 
outlined. In the sixth and final chapter, the research conclusions and recommendations 
are stated. 
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CHAPTER 2 – Background and Literature 
 
In this chapter, the “lean satellite” approach as a paradigm shift from the “small 
satellite” approach is explained. Moreover, the different notions of cost, schedule, and 
reliability as applied to satellite systems engineering is discussed and the importance of 
their consideration for lean satellite programs is described. 
 
2.1. From “small satellite” to “lean satellite” - The necessity of a standardized 
terminology 
Though “small satellites” are present since the beginning of the space era in 1957, a 
standardized definition was never established of what the mass, size, and/or volume a 
“small satellite” should be [5]. With the development of the “small satellites” market 
and the desire to miniaturize satellites as much as possible, many different 
sub-categories of “small satellites” have emerged since the last 20 years. Among them 
are “micro-, nano-, pico-, femto-satellites and CubeSats”, whose number is 
exponentially increasing since 2012 [3]. Yet, from this wide range of “small satellites” 
designation, only CubeSats’ design is standardized [6], whereas other categories’ 
definition depends on the country, developing entity, or even decade considered [3, 7-9]. 
At first sight, it does not seem that having different mass definitions for the same 
satellite category are troublesome. Let us take a step back and consider two case 
scenarios. In the first scenario, consider an international collaboration on the 
development of at least one “nano-satellite” for remote sensing applications. During the 
conceptual design phase of the project, entity A and entity B thought and designed 
separately a “nano-satellite” to present to each other after a few months. Mid-point to 
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the conceptual design phase, entities A and B meet and present their own vision of the 
“nano-satellite”. For entity A, “nano-satellite” meant a limitation of 10kg and 
accordingly to this mass constraint, chose a low resolution and narrow spectrum imager 
easily adaptable for a 10kg satellite. For entity B, however, “nano-satellite” meant a 
limitation of 50kg and accordingly chose high resolution and wide spectrum imager, and 
even add a propulsion system for de-orbit purpose. From this misunderstanding of what 
a “nano-satellite” mass is, entity A might stop its collaboration with entity B due to lack 
of funding for a 50kg-class “nano-satellite”. Even if the international collaboration is 
pursued, time, money, and energy was lost during the few months the conceptual design 
phase lasted. 
One might argue that this scenario is unlikely or even absurd, but let us remember 
that when one thinks a certain criteria is obvious and thus implicitly understood by 
everyone, one tends to forget to verify that this criteria is actually obvious and similar 
for everyone. Two famous, but unfortunate, examples of very promising systems that 
failed due to that “obvious criteria” factor are Mars Climate Orbiter in which it was 
obvious the international unit system should prevail [10], and more recently ASTRO-H 
for which it was obvious to input the right sign to limit the satellite rotational speed [11]. 
These examples resulted in a loss of approximately USD125 million [12] for Mars 
Climate Orbiter and USD360 million [13] for ASTRO-H. This does not include the cost 
of the scientific discoveries and advances that could have been made if the systems had 
been executed properly. Though for the purpose of illustration the Mars Climate Orbiter 
and ASTRO-H failures were simplified, I understand that one “simple” mistake is 
unlikely to result in the complete failure of such complex space systems. An 
accumulation of “simple” failures and processes mistakes, however, can; and preventing 
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“simple” failures starts by clearly defining the obvious.  
For the second scenario, consider a private entity that wants to develop a “small 
satellite” and is looking for investments from either the government or private investors 
with little or no knowledge on the technicalities of the space sector. There is usually not 
much time to convince someone your project is valuable and thus, worth being funded. 
Unfortunately the terminology “small satellite” tends to connote “small capabilities”, 
“small objectives”, and/or “small results” when considering limitations on power 
generation, data rates, and instruments resolution [14]. This infamous image makes it 
even more difficult to convince investors that “small satellites” can actually help and 
benefit the society and is worth the investment. 
From these scenarios, it clearly appears that the “small satellite” terminology is not 
obvious. It is a confusing and negatively connoted terminology. It could therefore lead 
to great misunderstanding with possible consequences of having troubles finding 
funding or troubles concretizing international and/or domestic collaborations and 
partnerships. 
 
The question remains: if a terminology based on satellite’s mass, size and/or volume 
is not appropriate, what is the terminology that could better describe and encompass the 
goals to be achieved by non-traditional satellites? 
 
For answering this question, it is necessary to understand the essence of 
non-traditional satellites. Non-traditional satellites objective is not to be “small” either 
in size or capabilities. Their essence is to adopt a development strategy different from 
traditional satellites to allow satellites’ development to be fast and at low cost as 
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compared to traditional satellites’ schedule and cost. 
A definition of non-traditional satellites based on the development philosophy rather 
than on a mass, size and/or volume is not a novel idea. In 1994, Fleeter [15] already 
pointed out that issue. Yet, it is only in 2014 that a group of international experts 
proposed to adopt the “lean satellite” terminology to designate non-traditional satellites 
developed in a fast and low cost manner [16]. As of October 2016, the work is still 
being undergoing and the group is actively working through the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Academy of Astronautics 
(IAA) to establish official report and possibly standards defining the requirements for a 
satellite to be considered “lean”. 
“Lean” is not a new word, but its utilization in combination with satellite engineering 
is novel. The “lean” concept was first introduced through the Toyota production system 
and the associated book from Ohno [17]. Though in this book the Toyota production 
system is not qualified using the actual “lean” terminology, Ohno’s work at Toyota was 
later described as “lean manufacturing” by Womack et al. [18]. The “lean” concept was 
born. Later, in addition to “lean manufacturing”, concepts of “lean enterprise”, “lean 
systems engineering”, “lean thinking” and even “lean aerospace” emerged [19-22]. 
The general concept of leanness is to deliver to the customer the desired product in 
the fastest manner and at the lowest cost possible. To achieve this, there are four core 
values to adopt. 
1) Minimize waste – Waste has many forms. It could be waiting time, 
overproduction, defective products, and more. As countermeasures, just-in-time, 
no inventory, production flow, and quality control approaches should be adopted. 
2) Produce valuable product – This mostly means to deliver to the customer the 
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desired product. In other word, the production of a product should be driven by 
the customer’s demand not by the company desire to push a certain product on 
the market. 
3) Respect employees – Employees’ talent should not be wasted at watching a 
machine to make sure it is working properly. Instead, employees should be 
trained to be flexible and multi-tasks capable workers. This way, their work 
actually adds value to the product by limiting defective pieces and wasting time 
for examples. In the meantime, the machine can monitor itself for malfunctions. 
As main users of the production plant, they should also be asked their opinion on 
how the production plant can be improved. 
4) Improve continuously – Even though waste, delivery time, and costs have been 
reduced by 95% from 2015 to 2016, for example, it is not a reason to stop the 
improvement and maintain the same way of producing from 2016 to 2017. There 
is always a process that can be improved, made faster and less costly. It is 
important not to rest on the accomplishments made, but looking forward to 
continuously improving them from one point in time to another. 
The “lean” concept emerged in the automobile industry and therefore some parts are 
difficultly transferrable to the satellite industry. An example of limitation is the number 
of units to be produced in a year. In the automobile industry, a same car model can be 
produced at thousands of thousands copies. In the current satellite industry, however, it 
is unlikely that a same satellite will be produced a thousand times even for 
mega-constellation such as One Web [23] or Planet Labs [24]. Another limitation is the 
environment the two products should undergo. Automobiles should be resistant to rain, 
snow, dirt, and be safe; but satellites should survive in space, in a vacuum, without the 
22 | 148 
possibility to be maintained or repaired during their on-orbit lifetime, while exposed to 
harsh radiations that can damage electronics, as well as extreme and fast temperature 
variations. These imply thorough and costly on-ground testing, and even more costly 
launch to put the satellite on-orbit. From these limitations, it is clear that “lean” can 
currently be applied to the satellite industry only until a certain extent. 
One might argue that due to all these differences and consequent limitations, “lean” 
philosophy cannot be applied to satellites engineering. Let us remember two critical 
points. The first point is that “lean” is about delivering to a customer the desired product 
in the fastest manner and at the lowest costs possible. This is applicable to any 
industries, from the electronic chip maker to the cranes maker going through 
automobiles and satellites industries. Second, though the “lean” concept has emerged 
from the automobiles industry, this is not about comparing automobiles industry with 
satellites industry. This is about developing satellites in a new and forward philosophy 
to, again, ensure low cost and fast development as compared to traditional satellites. 
From this perspective, the terminology “lean satellites” is particularly adapted and 
tackle appropriately the development philosophy adopted by the non-traditional 
satellites makers. 
 
2.2. “Fast development” and “low cost” approach – The foundation for lean 
satellite programs 
The precedent section highlighted the essence of lean satellite programs, i.e. fast 
development and low cost, and in this section the importance, feasibility, and limitations 
of such development philosophy is described. 
Until the 1990s, stakeholders for satellites’ design, manufacturing, testing, and 
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operations were mainly governments through their respective space agencies. Satellites 
and spacecraft in general, were getting more complex integrating advanced payload for 
remote sensing, communication, or planetary exploration applications. However, 30 
years after the success of the Apollo missions, in an instable political climate between 
the Cold War, the war in Vietnam, and the war in Iraq, the budget for space development 
was limited [25, 26] and it was no longer suitable to have space assets taking decades to 
develop with consequent cost overruns. As an innovative way to continue developing 
innovative systems with a constrained budget, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), established the Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) policies in 1992 
to “decrease the amount of time and cost for each mission and to increase the number 
of missions and overall scientific results obtained on each mission” [27]. 
NASA was not the only one to implement the FBC policies, its partners did too. This 
resulted in successful missions such as the planetary exploration mission NEAR in 
collaboration with the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU/APL) 
[28] or the ocean and climate forecasting mission JASON-1 in collaboration with the 
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) [29]. In total, 31 missions were developed 
by NASA and its partners over 16 years from 1992 to 2008 [30]. 
Thanks to the FBC philosophy initiated by NASA, the market of “small satellites” 
was opened to new comers, such as universities, that previously had little or no 
experience in practical satellite engineering. In the 2000s, these universities started to 
design, manufacture, test, and operate their own satellite as practical hands-on projects 
to educate tomorrow’s engineers to space engineering. This lean satellite revolution was 
further pushed forward by the establishment of the CubeSats standard by Twiggs and 
Puig-Suari [2]. Through the expansion of the lean satellite development philosophy, it 
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became possible for one entity with restricted resources to fully develop several 
satellites, namely constellation, to achieve significant and meaningful scientific 
objectives. Successful examples from a mission and educational standpoints are the 
QB50 mission that aims at taking measurements in the lower thermosphere [31], 
UNISAT program that aims at testing terrestrial technology on-orbit [32], HORYU 
series that aims at studying on-orbit the principles of discharge generation on solar 
panels [33], and HODOYOSHI program that aims at observing the Earth with different 
types of instruments [34].  
To sustain the enthusiasm of the space community toward lean satellite programs, 
different programs emerged to encourage and promote space utilization through lean 
satellite applications. Some examples are the Fly Your Satellite! program by the 
European Space Agency (ESA) that offers full support from development to test and 
launch of CubeSat [35], the Satellite Contest that aims at “activating basic and applied 
research related to the space science and technology” for high school to university 
students [36], and also the Mission Idea Contest that offers an international platform to 
promote outstanding ideas for space utilization from individuals or groups of space 
enthusiasts [37]. 
Since the 2010s, the market for lean satellites is booming and new private companies 
are entering into the lean satellite commerce [3, 38]. These space ventures aim at 
building satellites constellations to provide different services such as Earth observation, 
weather forecast, or telecommunications, and also spacecraft to achieve goals emerging 
from outside of the box thinking. One of the most interesting points of these ventures is 
that they succeeded in tackling the interest of investors with no prior involvement in the 
space sector opening the door to new intrepid space utilization that could have not been 
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considered before due to their excessive “fantasy”, such as asteroid mining. 
With nearly 25 years of experience and growth in adopting a lean philosophy in 
satellite engineering, not only the importance and feasibility of the approach was 
demonstrated, but the growing interest in such approach was also shown from parts with 
originally no involvement in the space sector. Moreover, a lean approach is not only 
significant for space agencies or private companies to develop satellites in a fast and 
low cost manner in order to increase the number of missions and resulting number of 
data. It is also significant to new comers such as universities, developing countries, and 
emerging space ventures to provide a new approach to the teaching of engineering 
through hands-on activities and to offer services to a larger part of the population in a 
new and disruptive manner. 
 
There is however a main drawback to a philosophy solely based on fast development 
and low cost approach: the lack of quality of the end product. Though this problem was 
somewhat tackled in the NASA’s FBC policies under the “better” part, it has failed to be 
unequivocally demonstrated. The skeptical to NASA’s FBC policies even say to choose 
only two parameters out of the three. The skepticism mostly comes from two points: 1) 
under the FBC policies, NASA lost nearly 25% of all the missions developed [27]; 2) 
when NASA decided in adopting the FBC policies, no definition, implementation plan, 
or guidance using quantitative parameters were established, which lead to an absence of 
common understanding of the FBC policies [27, 39, 40]. 
In this research, reliability is used as a quantitative measure of how “better” a system 
can be compared to another and in the following section, the importance of reliability 
consideration along with cost and schedule for the success and sustainability of lean 
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satellite programs is described. 
 
2.3. “Reliability” and the “PI2” action plan – The cement to sustainable lean 
satellite programs 
As described in the previous section, fast development and low cost are the 
foundations of lean satellite programs. However, not taking into account reliability, i.e. 
the quantification of how well the system will perform on-orbit, would be a great 
mistake. In this section, the importance of reliability consideration along with schedule 
and cost is thus investigated. 
Reliability is a mathematical function defined as the probability of non-failure. 
Specifically for space systems, it can be seen as the quantification of the system 
performances in space at a certain given time. A space system with a low reliability at a 
certain given time means that the system is most likely unable to perform as planned, i.e. 
is most likely to fail. On the other hand, a space system with a high reliability at a 
certain given time means that the system is most likely able to perform as planned, i.e. 
is most likely to succeed. Therefore, according to each lean satellite programs objectives, 
there is a sufficient reliability to be achieved at a certain given time on-orbit. How much 
this “sufficient reliability” should be is not to be defined by me. It should be defined by 
the stakeholders of a considered lean satellite program. Some might consider that a 60% 
reliability after 6 months on-orbit for a 1 year mission is “sufficient”, whereas others 
might consider that a 95% reliability is “sufficient”. Though it is not my intention to put 
a number on “sufficient reliability”, we can broadly define it as a reliability that will 
ensure the program minimum success criteria. 
Without taking into consideration the reliability, lean satellites are launched for the 
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solely purpose of launching a satellite. This was an important first step at the beginning 
of the space era or even at the beginning of the lean satellites revolution to demonstrate 
feasibility and capability, but nearly 60 and 25 year after the respective beginning of 
these eras, this is not true anymore. Launched lean satellites should have an added value, 
such as providing remote sensing data, telecommunications capabilities, and more for 
the benefit of society. Without this added value, lean satellites will turn quickly into 
useless man made space objects, namely space debris; and with the ever growing space 
debris problem [41] and consequent concerns rising in the space community [42, 43] 
this is not acceptable. More importantly, it should not be accepted in order to ensure a 
sustainable space environment and a sustainable lean approach to satellites engineering. 
Unfortunately, from on-orbit surveys, Dubos [44] showed that “small satellites” 
present the highest rate of infant mortality among all satellites categories considered. In 
other words, “small satellites” have the highest likelihood to fail soon after their 
insertion on-orbit. More strikingly, when considering only the CubeSats category, the 
infant mortality rate rises by 1/3 as compared to the “small satellites” category [45]. 
This high rate of infant mortality points out that AIT processes of lean satellites prior to 
launch is insufficient. There is therefore a need to identify the critical AIT processes to 
be performed prior to launch to improve lean satellites reliability after launch. 
In [46], it was shown that less than half of pico- and nano-satellites successfully 
inserted on-orbit actually achieves full mission success. From different on-orbit failure 
surveys [47-49], it appears that the two main drivers of satellites failure regardless of 
the category are: 1) solar array deployment/operations sub-systems account for about 
25% of the failures and 2) communication sub-system accounts for about 20% of the 
failures. If we take a closer look at the CubeSats category, there are three main drivers 
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of satellites failure [45]: 1) electrical power supply sub-system accounts for nearly 45% 
of the failures, 2) on-board computer system accounts for 20% of the failures, and 3) 
communication sub-system accounts for nearly 20% of the failures. 
Despite the fact that data on lean satellites failures prior to launch is inexistent or 
unavailable and though the number of data on on-orbit satellites failures is scarce, it 
allows us to draft an action plan based on three pillars to ensure lean satellites sufficient 
reliability after launch: 1) prevent satellite infant mortality, 2) identify culprit 
sub-system(s) driving failures, and 3) improve AIT strategy prior to launch. This is what 
I decided to call the PI
2
 action plan for Prevent, Identify, and Improve. The strong base 
of the PI
2
 action plan relies on preventing infant mortality to ensure that the lean 
satellite will be reliable enough for the program minimum success criteria to be 
achieved. Based on that, culprit sub-systems driving lean satellites failures must be 
identified and the corresponding efficient and optimal AIT strategy must be improved 
accordingly to the lean program development. Thanks to this action plan, lean satellite 
programs will succeed by being driven not only by a low cost and fast development 
approach, but also by sufficient reliability insurance (Figure 2-1). 
 
 
Figure 2-1. PI
2
 action plan for successful and sustainable lean satellite programs 
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CHAPTER 3 – Methodology 
 
The methodologies for the experimental data collection and for the simulations were 
described in [50, 51]. However, for the readers to be able to fully understand this 
research, the methodologies are also detailed in this chapter. 
 
3.1. HORYU-IV experimental data 
3.1.1. A brief overview of HORYU-IV project 
HORYU-IV, also designated as the Arc Event Generator and Investigation 
Satellite, is a lean satellite developed within approximately two years at Kyushu 
Institute of Technology in Japan. HORYU-IV is a cubic satellite, whose envelope is 
about 45cm in all dimensions (Figure 3-1) for a total mass of about 10kg. The satellite 
mission statement is to acquire on-orbit data of discharge phenomena occurring on a 
high voltage solar array to deepen understanding of satellite charging, to contribute to 
the reliability improvement of current space systems, and to positively contribute to the 
realization of future high power space systems. To achieve these objectives, an 
oscilloscope and a camera system were developed in house as described in [52] and [53]. 
In total, HORYU-IV carries nine payloads, which along with the bus characteristics are 
described in [54]. The preliminary execution of its main mission and sub-missions were 
a success and the satellite is still operational as of August 2017. 
Over its two years development, HORYU-IV underwent various assembly and 
integration phases as well as environmental, mechanical, and functional testing. During 
the AIT phases, the number of failures, the time at which failures occurred, and the 
sub-system(s) involved were recorded. Based on the acquired data, plots of the 
30 | 148 
cumulative number of failures versus time could be obtained and the cumulative failure 
rate as well as the time between failures could be estimated. Data on failures occurrence 
prior to a satellite launch are inexistent or not available. Thanks to the data compiled 
and analyzed during HORYU-IV project, main culprit systems leading to failures 
depending on the AIT phase and malfunctions occurrence over the different project 
phases could be identified prior to launch. The details of the experimental data 
collection are presented in section 3.1.2. 
With HORYU-IV data collection, it is intended to help future satellite developers 
and managers to identify, prior to launch, while the satellite is a repairable system, 
critical sub-systems, and project phases in order to decide where to concentrate 
resources (workmanship, financial, etc…) to develop a lean satellite, i.e. adopting a 
philosophy of fast delivery and low cost while achieving sufficient reliability. 
 
 
Figure 3-1. HORYU-IV external appearance, dimensions, and orientation 
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3.1.2. HORYU-IV experimental data collection methodology 
HORYU-IV development was separated into three main phases: 1) bread board 
model (BBM), 2) engineering model (EM) itself separated into two sub-phases, EM1 
and EM2, and 3) flight model (FM). These are respectively equivalent to phases B, C, 
and D as defined for NASA projects life cycle [2]. 
The number of failures, the time at which failures were discovered, and failures 
types were only recorded during the EM and FM phases. This corresponds to an 
approximate period of one year of experimental data collection. 
The BBM lasted from October 2013 until the end of 2014. During this phase, 
satellite bus sub-systems were designed depending on payload requirements and the 
satellite structural and thermal models were established. During BBM, the payload 
requirements were constantly improved to ensure the payload functions are executed as 
planned. Hence, the sub-systems (payload or bus) design during BBM is constantly 
evolving and it was judged irrelevant to record data on failures that occurred during this 
phase. After sub-system requirements were decided and verified, the project moved to 
the EM. 
During the EM, the different sub-systems’ printed circuit boards (PCB) are 
manufactured. Then, testing of sub-systems as standalone and integrated sub-systems 
were performed. In addition to electrical performance verifications, the satellite as a 
whole also underwent thermal vacuum, vibrations, and shock testing. EM phase was 
separated in two sub-phases: EM1 and EM2, whose characteristics are explained in the 
last two paragraphs of this section. After the satellite soundness was verified, the project 
moved to its final phase, FM. 
During FM, HORYU-IV was extensively tested as a whole to ensure its 
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soundness after its launch. As for EM, electrical performances testing and 
environmental tests were carried out. For the latter, in addition to the aforementioned 
environmental tests, FM also underwent plasma testing. HORYU-IV‘s main mission is 
to study arcing phenomenon occurring on dedicated triple junction solar cells in low 
earth orbit (LEO). To achieve this objective, the satellite must be biased to a high 
negative voltage in comparison with the surrounding plasma environment and this is 
performed by attracting and collecting electrons contained in space plasma. Therefore, 
for HORYU-IV case, testing in simulated LEO environment, i.e. plasma test, was 
critical to ensure its main mission minimum success. The details of testing performed 
during EM and FM are provided in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1. Details of testing carried out during HORYU-IV EM and FM phases 
  EM1 EM2 FM 
Electrical testing 
Electrical performance verifications test – 
standalone sub-system 
○ ○ ○ 
Electrical performance verifications test – 
integrated sub-systems 
○ ○ ○ 
End-to-end test N/A N/A ○ 
Launch environment 
testing 
Vibrations test N/A ○ ○ 
Shock test N/A ○ ○ 
Space environment 
testing 
Thermal vacuum test N/A ○ ○ 
Thermal cycle test N/A ○ ○ 
Plasma test (LEO environment simulation) N/A ○ ○ 
 
HORYU-IV is constituted of seven bus sub-systems and nine payload 
sub-systems. For EM1, there were three main AIT phases: 1) the on-board computer 
(OBC), electrical power supply (EPS), and communication (COM) sub-systems were 
tested as standalone sub-systems; 2) OBC, EPS, and COM were integrated and tested. 
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The integrated board including OBC, EPS, and COM is hereafter designated as the 
mother board; 3) the S-band/Digi-singer (Sband-SNG), high voltage solar array 
(HVSA), double Langmuir probe/photoelectrons current measurement/vacuum arc 
thruster (DLP-PEC-VAT, hereafter designated as Big apple), and attitude and orbit 
determination/Earth photography camera (AODS-CAM) sub-systems were integrated 
one by one with the mother board and tested. During EM1, many modifications were 
made to the different sub-systems and new PCBs integrating the modifications were 
manufactured. The newly manufactured PCBs were tested as EM2. During EM2, AIT 
processes similar to EM1 were performed. Moreover, the on-board oscilloscope (OBO) 
and arc vision camera (AVC) sub-systems were integrated with the mother board and 
tested. Finally, launch and space environment testing were performed after all the 
sub-systems were integrated with the structure. The main verifications performed during 
electrical tests are described in Table 3-2. 
 
Table 3-2. Main verifications performed during electrical performances testing 
Sub-system Tests as standalone sub-system 
Tests as integrated 
sub-systems 
Mother 
board 
OBC ・MPU reset 
・Satellite reset 
・AD converters 
・Share flash 
memory 
・H8 reset 
・Satellite reset 
・AD converters 
・HK saved to flash 
memory 
・HK transmission 
・Data decoding 
・CW transmission 
interruption 
・Command reception 
EPS ・DCDC converters 
・S-band TX 
switch 
・Satellite reset 
・Separation 
switches 
・Kill switches 
・Voltage 
dividers 
・Current 
sensors 
COM ・CW transmission 
・Command 
reception 
・Data 
transmission 
34 | 148 
Mother board + 
Sband-SNG, 
HVSA, Big 
apple, 
AODS-CAM, 
OBO, or AVC 
- - 
・Reading of missions flash 
memory 
・Writing to missions flash 
memory 
 
During EM1, AIT processes were performed by the same personnel in series and 
the time at which failures occurred, as well as AIT processes start time, breaks, AIT 
processes resume time, and AIT processes end time were precisely recorded. However, 
for EM2 and FM, AIT processes were performed in parallel and various personnel 
recorded failures. Therefore, though failures occurrence and type was well documented, 
details on AIT processes break time, failures occurrence time, and AIT processes end 
time were overlooked due to their tedious character. As a result, for a better 
representation of the results over the different AIT phases, it was assumed for all AIT 
phases, i.e. EM1, EM2, and FM, that for a given AIT period, AIT processes were 
carried out from Monday through Friday, except if stated otherwise, for a period of 8 
hours for all AIT processes but thermal vacuum test and safety verifications at Tsukuba 
Space Center. During thermal vacuum testing period, the testing period was 24 hours 
and during safety verifications at Tsukuba Space Center, the testing period was 2 hours 
per day. The details of the AIT processes period for all phases are presented in Table 
3-3. 
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Table 3-3. HORYU-IV’s AIT processes period description 
Phase AIT processes 
AIT dates 
[YYYY/MM/DD] 
AIT time 
per day [h] 
EM1 Electrical 
performance 
verifications test – 
standalone 
sub-systems 
OBC 2015/02/24-28 8 
EPS 2015/02/24-28 8 
COM ・2015/02/24-28 
・2015/04/13 
・201504/21 
8 
Electrical 
performance 
verifications test – 
integrated 
sub-systems 
Mother board ・2015/03/01-07, 
09-13, 16-20, 23-27, 
30-31 
・2015/04/01-03, 06-08 
8 
Mother board + 
other 
sub-systems 
・2015/04/09-10, 
13-17, 19-24, 26-30 
・2015/05/01, 04-06 
8 
EM2 Electrical performance verifications test 
– integrated sub-systems 
・2015/06/11, 29-30 
・2015/07/01-03, 06-10 
・2015/08/10-14, 17-20 
8 
Sub-systems/structure interface 
verification 
・2015/06/11-19, 21-26 
8 
Vibrations ・2015/02-04 8 
Shock ・2015/07/05-06 8 
Thermal vacuum ・2015/07/11-18 
・2015/08/03-09 
24 
FM Electrical performance verifications test 
– integrated sub-systems 
・2015/08/27-28, 31 
・2015/09/01-04, 
07-12, 14-18, 21-25, 
28-30 
・2015/10/01-02, 
05-09, 11-17, 19-23, 
26-28 
・2015/11/01, 05-06, 
13, 16-20, 23-28, 30 
・2015/12/01-04, 
07-09, 13-17 
8 
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FM Sub-systems/structure interface 
verification 
・2015/09/28-30 
・2015/10/01-02, 
05-09, 11-17, 19-23, 
26-28 
8 
 Thermal vacuum ・2015/10/29-30 
・2015/12/10-11 
24 
 Vibrations ・2015/11/02-03 
・2015/12/18 
8 
 Shock ・2015/11/04, 10 8 
 ・2015/11/09, 11-12 2*a 
 Plasma ・2015/12/21-25, 28-31 
・2016/01/01-02, 04 
8 
 Batteries charging ・2016/01/05-08 8 
 Safety verifications prior to delivery ・2016/01/11-15 2*b 
*This corresponds to safety related verifications performed at Tsukuba Space Center: a) 
before/after shock test, b) before satellite delivery. 
 
For all phases, the failure occurrence date, the type of failures, and the total AIT 
processes time were recorded and the results are presented in Chapter 4, sections 4.1.1 
to 4.1.4. 
 
3.2. Simulations methodology 
All simulations were performed using MATLAB® version R2013b and the 
methodology is based on [55]. Moreover, it was demonstrated in several studies [47, 56, 
57] that satellites reliability is well-fitted by a two-parameter Weibull distribution with 
the scale parameter characterizing the failure rate and the shape parameter 
characterizing the infant mortality. This also applies in this dissertation. The program 
scripts can be consulted from Appendix A and Appendix B. 
The failure rate, r(t), and the reliability are respectively given in Equation 3-1 and 
Equation 3-2 [58]. 
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Equation 3-1. Failure rate definition 
 
With N(t), the cumulative number of failures; t, the time in hours; λ, the scale 
parameter; α, the growth parameter; and β=1-α, the shape parameter. 
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Equation 3-2. Reliability definition 
 
With tT=T, the total cumulative testing time in hours; t0, the time at which the test 
started; and A, constant from the integration. Here, t0=0, therefore the reliability is as 
described in Equation 3-3. 
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Equation 3-3. Simplified reliability equation t0=0 
 
Based on HORYU-IV experience, it is assumed that the satellite goes through seven 
main different AIT processes: 1) electrical performance verifications (flat satellite), 2) 
structure assembly, 3) electrical performance verifications (as assembled satellite), 4) 
thermal vacuum test, 5) plasma test, 6) software performance verifications, and 7) 
end-to-end missions simulation test. Though in practice some AIT processes overlap 
with each other, the simulation algorithm assumes that the different AIT processes are 
carried out in series. 
Here, vibrations and shock tests are not taken into account as AIT processes in the 
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simulations. The rationale is that vibrations and shock tests are performed for ensuring 
safety from the launcher standpoint and they should be performed in agreement with the 
launcher schedule. Therefore, they are not a main driver per se of the lean satellite 
program AIT processes schedule, they are a necessity. From experience, it is very 
unlikely that vibrations and shock tests will take more than 30 days each for a lean 
satellite program. 
From the seven AIT processes, it results that there are in total nine failure modes. 
First, there is one failure mode that manifests itself only during a specific process 
among the seven AIT processes (single-AIT failure mode). For example during the 
structure assembly, it was found out that a piece cannot be assembled because another 
part of the structure hinders its harness. In this case, the failure is specific to the 
structure assembly and other AIT processes, such as electrical performance verifications 
test, can be performed in parallel if needed until the failure is addressed. 
Then, there is one failure mode that manifests itself in any of the seven AIT 
processes (cross-AIT failure mode). For example during electrical performance 
verifications, it was found out that OBC can read the memory of other sub-systems, but 
the read data are not correct due to an unknown reason. Due to time constraint, despite 
the fact that the reason of the failure is still not understood at the end of the electrical 
performance verifications test, testing must continue and thermal vacuum test is 
performed. During thermal vacuum test, it can be verified that OBC can read other 
sub-systems memory, yet the read data are not correct as previously found out. 
Finally, there is one failure mode for random failures (random failure mode). For 
example, though no failure associated with reset function was detected during EM 
thermal vacuum test, failure occurs during FM thermal vacuum test. 
39 | 148 
Following these, the failure rate can be expressed as in Equation 3-4. 
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Equation 3-4. Failure rate expression taking into account the different failure modes 
 
With i, the index for the considered AIT process (i = 1, 2, …, 7) and where the first 
term accounts for the single-AIT failure mode, the second term accounts for the 
cross-AIT failure mode, and the third term accounts for the random failure mode. 
In the first AIT process, the failure rate is given by Equation 3-4 with i=1. Then, the 
reliability at time T in the first AIT process is obtained as described in Equation 3-5. 
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Equation 3-5. Reliability at time T for the first AIT process 
 
Where the time T is counted from the start of the first AIT process. 
In the second AIT process, the failure rate is written as described in Equation 3-6. 
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Equation 3-6. Failure rate of the second AIT process 
 
With TAIT1, the total testing time of the first AIT process that should be taken into 
account for cross-AIT failure mode. 
Then, the reliability at time T in the second AIT process is obtained as described in 
Equation 3-7. 
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Equation 3-7. Reliability at time T for the second AIT process 
 
Where the time T is counted from the start of the second AIT process and the 
constant A, from the integration in Equation 3-3, is equal to λ02*(TAIT1)
β02
 for the 
cross-AIT failure mode. 
Likewise, the reliability at time T from the start of the i-th AIT process is obtained as 
described in Equation 3-8. 
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Equation 3-8. Reliability at time T for the i-th AIT process 
 
Where TotAITi is the total testing time until the i-th-1 AIT process for cross-AIT 
failure mode and it is defined by Equation 3-9. 
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Equation 3-9. Definition of the total testing time. TotAITi 
 
Each AIT process time is originally defined to be Ti=20, 50, 100, or 200 hours. In the 
simulation, the testing time is considered in the unit of one hour. Within the testing time 
Ti, the judgment of whether a failure occurs or not is performed every hour. The time 
index is designated by Tstep, which is from zero to Ti hours. An illustration of the 
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process is presented in Figure 3-2 for the case of Ti=10h. In this case, Tstep is from zero 
to 10. 
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Figure 3-2. Illustration of the simulation algorithm 
 
For the first simulation run, it is decided whether a failure occurred or not by using a 
random number ηi1. A failure occurs if ηi1 satisfies Equation 3-10. 
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Equation 3-10. Criteria to determine whether a failure occurred or not 
 
With T=Tstep+ΔTri+ΔTsi, the total testing time at the time index, Tstep, for the 
considered AIT process. The meaning of ΔTri and ΔTsi is defined in the subsequent 
paragraphs. 
Upon discovery of a failure, the failure mode to which it is associated is determined 
by using a second random number, ηi2. If ηi2 satisfies Equation 3-11, the failure is 
associated to single-AIT failure mode. In this case, the number of failures associated to 
the single-AIT failure mode is incremented, the scale parameter, λi, is multiplied by a 
factor εi to take into account the failure rate improvement upon failure discovery, at the 
next run the AIT process resumes one hour prior to the failure discovery 
(Tstep=Tstep–1) to take into account the countermeasure to be implemented for the 
failure resolution as shown in Figure 3-2, and the time delay ΔTsi associated to the one 
hour penalty is incremented by one. Here, one hour is assumed sufficient to resolve a 
failure because the failure is specific to the considered AIT and therefore its origin can 
be easily assessed. For example, if during the satellite assembly it is noticed that an 
electronic board cannot be mounted to the structure, the mounting failure origin can 
easily be assessed within less than an hour to be an interface issue, such as holes 
misalignment or wrong electronic board dimensions.. It should be noted that failure 
resolution does not mean that the failure is corrected, but the failure origin is assessed 
and proper actions can be taken to solve the problem, while the test continues. From the 
previous example, after noticing the interface issue between structure and the electronic 
board, other parts of the structure can be assembled while in parallel the electronic 
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board is corrected, which could take more than one hour, but the assembly phase itself 
does not suffer from this reparation time. Another example is if a failure specific to 
thermal vacuum occurs, one hour for its correction is most likely unreasonable since it 
takes several hours just for the chamber to return to atmospheric pressure upon test 
termination. However, engineers can decide that the step or part of the step that lead to 
the failure is skipped for the remaining testing, while other functionalities can be tested. 
In this case, failure resolution corresponds to the decision process, which will unlikely 
take more than one hour when a failure specific to an AIT process occurs. 
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Equation 3-11. Criteria to determine single-AIT failure mode 
 
If ηi2 satisfies Equation 3-12, the failure is associated to cross-AIT failure mode. In 
this case, the number of failures associated to the cross-AIT failure mode is incremented, 
the scale parameter, λ0i, is multiplied by a factor ε0i to take into account the failure rate 
improvement upon failure discovery, and at the next run the AIT process continues, i.e. 
the time index is incremented by one hour (Tstep=Tstep+1). Cross-AIT failures are 
failures common to any of the AIT processes because they could not be resolved at the 
end of a specific AIT process, however, due to time constraint, testing should pursue. 
Therefore in this case no time penalty is taken into account. 
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Equation 3-12. Criteria to determine cross-AIT failure mode 
 
If ηi2 satisfies Equation 3-13, the failure is associated to random failure mode. In this 
case, the number of failures associated to the random failure mode is incremented, the 
random parameter, θri, is multiplied by a factor εri to take into account the failure rate 
improvement upon failure discovery, at the next run the AIT process is restarted from 
the beginning (Tstep=0), and the time delay ΔTri associated to the time penalty of 
restarting the AIT process is incremented by Tstep. For an example, see Figure 3-2. In 
this example, the random failure occurs at Tstep=9. By this time, the total testing time 
accumulated is 10h as one hour was already added due to the previous single-AIT type 
failure. Since it is a random failure, the test goes back to the beginning, but 10h testing 
time was already accumulated. Random failures are unpredictable failures that can 
occur due to parts mishandling or that occur during a test phase that was performed in a 
similar manner at an earlier stage of development, yet no failure was discovered during 
this previous stage of development. Therefore in this case, the failure origin cannot be 
determined easily or in some cases additional tests should be performed and to take into 
account the long time associated with failure origin investigation and/or additional 
testing, it is assumed in the simulation that the test restart from the beginning. 
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Equation 3-13. Criteria to determine random failure mode 
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In case a failure is defined to belong to the single-AIT failure mode, the failure 
criticality is determined to evaluate the influence of the discovered failure on the overall 
lean satellite project development. In the case of failures belonging to cross-AIT or 
random failure modes, the criticality of the failure is not evaluated. For random failure, 
since it is difficult to determine the origin of the failure, the undergoing AIT process is 
assumed to restart. In this case, the failure is the most critical to the project AIT phase 
and associated AIT process cost. Therefore, its impact on the project, outside the 
considered AIT process, can be assumed negligible. For a failure belonging to 
cross-AIT failure mode, the failure is common to several AIT processes. In other word, 
it can be assumed that the failure was discovered and investigated at a previous AIT, 
subsequent time was thus dedicated to its resolution since at the previous AIT it could 
have been considered either as a single-AIT failure or random failure. Therefore, in this 
case, the failure criticality was already evaluated and it can be assumed it will be 
redundant to reevaluate it. 
For the evaluation of failure criticality, five levels of criticality were identified as 
described below. 
 Level A: no time for reparation is necessary. For example, a circuit line should 
be cut, which can be executed within seconds. 
 Level B1: low repairable time, less than 1 hour. For examples, easy components 
soldering or removal, a few in-house design changes, etc. 
 Level B2: medium repairable time, up to 1 day (8h). For examples, electrical 
design modifications, difficult components soldering or removal, several 
in-house design changes, etc. 
 Level B3: high repairable time, up to 1 business week (40h). For examples, new 
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parts need to be ordered (components in stock), minor design changes need to be 
outsourced, etc. 
 Level B4: very high repairable time, up to 1 month (176h). For examples, new 
parts need to be ordered (components out of stock), major design changes need 
to be outsourced, etc. 
Upon discovery of a single-AIT failure mode, a third random number, ηi3, is 
generated to determine the failure criticality level. If ηi3 satisfies Equation 3-14, the 
failure criticality corresponds to level A and no additional time is taken into account for 
its repair. 
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Equation 3-14. Criteria to determine failure criticality, level A 
 
With λiA, λiB1, λiB2, λiB3, and λiB4, the scale parameters for each critical level for a 
considered i-th AIT process; and βiA, βiB1, βiB2, βiB3, and βiB4, the shape parameter for 
each critical level for a considered i-th AIT process. 
The scale parameters, λiA, λiB1, λiB2, λiB3, and λiB4, are independent from each other 
and are independent from the scale parameters, λi and e0i, defined in the failure mode 
algorithm. Similarly, the shape parameters, βiA, βiB1, βiB2, βiB3, and βiB4, are independent 
from each other and are independent from the shape parameters, βi and β0i, defined in 
the failure mode algorithm. 
If ηi3 satisfies Equation 3-15, the failure criticality corresponds to level B1 and one 
hour is added on the overall project development time span to take into account the 
repair time. 
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Equation 3-15. Criteria to determine failure criticality, level B1 
 
If ηi3 satisfies Equation 3-16, the failure criticality corresponds to level B2 and 8 
hours (1 business day) are added on the overall project development time span to take 
into account the repair time. 
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Equation 3-16. Criteria to determine failure criticality, level B2 
 
If ηi3 satisfies Equation 3-17, the failure criticality corresponds to level B3 and 40 
hours (1 business week) are added on the overall project development time span to take 
into account the repair time. 
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Equation 3-17. Criteria to determine failure criticality, level B3 
 
If ηi3 satisfies Equation 3-18, the failure criticality corresponds to level B4 and 176 
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hours (1 business month) are added on the overall project development time span to 
take into account the repair time. 
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Equation 3-18. Criteria to determine failure criticality, level B4 
 
Moreover, in each case, the number of failures associated to the level A, B1, B2, B3, 
or B4 failure criticality is incremented and the corresponding scale parameter, λA, λB1, 
λB2, λB3, or λB4, is multiplied by the corresponding factor ε to take into account the 
failure rate improvement. 
For the simulation of the reliability after launch (Equation 3-19), each AIT process 
was run 1000 times and the resulting average value of λ0, λi, β0, βi, θr, the total testing 
time of each AIT, TAITi, and the average total testing time of all AIT processes 
combined, TtAIT (Equation 3-20), were used for the calculations. 
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Equation 3-19. Reliability after launch based on 1000 simulation runs 
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Equation 3-20. Definition of the average total testing time for all AIT processes 
combined, TtAIT 
 
The flowchart summarizing the simulation algorithm is presented in Figure 3-3. 
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Figure 3-3. Simulation algorithm flowchart 
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CHAPTER 4 – Results and Discussion 
 
Results and corresponding discussions were presented in [50, 51]. However, for the 
readers to be able to fully capture the recommendations established in this research, the 
results and their discussion are also detailed in this chapter. 
 
4.1. HORYU-IV experimental results and discussion 
4.1.1. Investigation of the number of failures vs. testing time 
Plots of the cumulative number of failures against cumulative testing time for 
the overall project development and each development phase are shown in Figure 4-1. It 
can be observed that at the end of each AIT phase, there is a plateau, which indicates 
that even if the AIT processes time is increased, only a few new failures are discovered. 
This is in good agreement with [59] that pointed out that most of failures are discovered 
during the early stage of testing. 
 
 
Figure 4-1. HORYU-IV cumulative number of failures vs. cumulative testing time for 
all the AIT phases 
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For EM1 (Figure 4-2), when OBC and EPS were tested as standalone 
sub-systems, the plateau can also be observed, whereas for COM it is absent. This is 
explained by the fact that all OBC and EPS functionalities, as presented in Figure 3-2, 
could be thoroughly tested within the 40h testing, whereas for COM, data transmission 
and command reception could not be verified, due to the discovery of critical failures 
with unknown origin. Moreover, due to schedule constraints, COM testing as a 
standalone sub-system had to be interrupted after about 55h of testing to move to 
integration testing. Therefore, the failure rate did not reach a constant value, i.e. the 
failure mode did not switch to random type failure, and no plateau was observed. 
 
 
Figure 4-2. HORYU-IV cumulative number of failures vs. cumulative testing time 
during EM1 phase for standalone sub-systems testing 
 
Upon integration of OBC, EPS, and COM, hereafter referred as mother board, it 
can be observed from Figure 4-3 that most failures were discovered within the first 25h 
of testing and after 50h of testing, 45% of the total number of failures were recorded for 
that integration phase. Moreover, the discovery of the remaining 55% of failures took 5 
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times more time than the discovery of the 45% of failures. This is explained by the fact 
that many failures emerged upon integration of the sub-systems, but after 50h of testing, 
the functionalities to be verified as described in Figure 3-2, were verified except for the 
remaining COM failures that emerged during COM standalone testing. To resolve the 
COM failures, different assumptions on their origin were established and corresponding 
countermeasures were implemented, but they were unsuccessful for the complete 
resolution of the COM failures. This period of trials-and-errors resulted in a long period 
of testing mostly focusing on COM with only a few new failures discovered from 50h to 
250h of mother board testing. 
 
 
Figure 4-3. HORYU-IV cumulative number of failures vs. cumulative testing time 
during EM1 phase for integrated sub-systems testing 
 
Upon integration of the mother board with the different sub-systems, COM 
failures remained and a similar testing pattern as for mother board testing can be 
observed. Within about 50h of testing, 67% of the failures resulting from the different 
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sub-systems integration were discovered, whereas it took 4 times more time to discover 
the remaining 33%. There are two main reasons in this case: 1) as for the mother board, 
COM remaining failures and the associated repairs trials-and-errors increased the AIT 
period and 2) another critical failure emerged with unknown origin for which 
sub-systems memory could not be accurately read when integrated with the mother 
board. During integration testing of mother board with other sub-systems, these two 
failures were the main drivers for long time testing after the initial 50h. 
At the end of nearly 450h of EM1 testing, COM failures were repaired and 
hence, were not a driver in the EM2 testing, whereas memory reading failure remained 
during EM2 testing. 
From HORYU-IV EM1 testing experience, it appeared that thorough standalone 
sub-system testing prior to integration helps in reducing the integration testing time. 
Moreover, due to the increase of the system complexity upon integration, origin and 
cause of failures are more difficult to trace, which results in longer testing time. 
Therefore, it seems that from a time management standpoint, it will be worthwhile for 
lean satellite developers to allocate sufficient testing time to prove the soundness of a 
sub-system individually prior to its integration with other sub-systems. 
 
For EM2 (Figure 4-4), as for EM1, most of the failures, 71%, are detected 
during the early stage of AIT phase, within the first 150h. This early stage high failure 
discovery rate is driven by the mechanical interface between the structural and electrical 
elements. The failure types vary from quick modifications such as correcting hole 
positions to more complex and costly modifications such as redesigning panels or PCBs 
to accommodate unforeseen fitting disturbances. 
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Figure 4-4. HORYU-IV cumulative number of failures vs. cumulative testing time 
during EM2 phase 
 
HORYU-IV structural elements were ordered to a local manufacturer, whose 
proximity allowed for fast treatment of the design modifications requests and pieces 
could be re-manufactured or modified within 1 or 2 business days for the simple design 
to 5 business days for the more complicated design. Moreover, there were no charges 
for delivery to or from the manufacturer since the site was accessible by short car ride 
from the university.  
After the EM satellite was assembled, electrical performance verifications as 
well as launch and space environment related testing took place. Though no failures 
occurred for the launch related testing, several failures were discovered during the 
thermal vacuum tests. It should be noted that the testing time indicated as “thermal 
vacuum” on Figure 4-4 includes electrical performance verifications prior and after the 
actual start of chamber’s vacuum and temperature cycles and most of failures were 
actually discovered during these pre- and post-test verifications. When the chamber’s 
vacuum and temperature cycles were running, only three new failures were discovered 
56 | 148 
at 360h and 384h during thermal vacuum No.1 and at 584h during thermal vacuum 
No.2. 
 
From EM AIT phase, there are three main lessons learned: 
1) mechanical and electrical interfaces verification should not be overlooked and 
satellite design should not rely solely on CAD; 
2) sufficient margin should be assumed to ensure harness and its associated 
curvature radius can be accommodated within the space between different structural 
elements and PCBs; and 
3) it seems very desirable from a time and cost standpoint that lean satellites 
developers select local manufacturers whenever possible. 
 
For FM (Figure 4-5), there were in total three sets of PCBs manufactured for 
each sub-system to be able to perform AIT processes in parallel. One set of PCBs was 
dedicated to be mounted with the FM satellite structure and be flown in space. The 
second set was dedicated to electrical functional verifications testing, i.e. all PCBs 
connected together without following satellite structure, namely flat satellite testing. 
The third set was dedicated to payloads individual electrical performance verifications 
and their space related testing, such as LEO simulated environment testing. Unlike for 
EM1 or EM2, new failures discovery rate for FM is relatively smooth until about 600h 
of testing. This is mainly explained by three factors: 1) lessons learned during EM phase 
were implemented and for example less structural/electrical interface failures occurred, 
2) electrical performance verifications were thoroughly performed during EM and only 
a few new failures emerged mainly due to final impedance adjustments, pins 
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assignments correction in software, or FM external parts inspection upon delivery, and 
3) after EM, the hardware design was well-defined and tested, and modifications in FM 
were mostly driven by software modifications, which were difficult to record. Though it 
should be noted that the latter results in error of the presented data for the cumulated 
number of failures, the trend of the failures discovery is assumed to be accurate since 
software failures were also under documented in EM phase. Therefore, EM and FM 
phases failures were recorded based on the same error and hence are comparable data 
sets. 
 
 
Figure 4-5. HORYU-IV cumulative number of failures vs. cumulative testing time for 
FM phase 
 
For the first thermal vacuum test, it should be noted that a failure that could have 
incapacitated the satellite during its first eclipse time was discovered during the first 
cycle at low temperature. This demonstrates the importance of carrying out space 
environment testing even for a small number of cycles. 
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From the end of the third electrical performance verifications test, around 600h, 
until the end of the second vibrations test around 730h, the profile shows a sudden 
increase of the failure rate. This is mainly due to the fact that during this period, 
payloads functions performances were tested more deeply to ensure mission minimum 
success. For examples, stress was put on integrated OBO, AVC, and S-band sub-systems 
since they are essential to the satellite main mission minimum success achievement. 
Stress was also put on L-band to ensure satellite can be reset even if all other 
implemented reset systems fail. Moreover, the ground station (GS) compatibility with 
the satellite was tested for the first time, which resulted in several modifications of the 
GS software for decoding satellite data. 
After 730h of testing, the failure rate became constant and not many new failures 
were discovered upon testing. However, it should be noted that for the plasma testing 
period, the plot shows only one new failure discovery, which could indicate that plasma 
testing might be unnecessary. However, the discovered failure was the inability of the 
main mission’s on-board oscilloscope to be triggered when discharges occurred. In case 
this failure would not have been uncovered during plasma testing, this would have 
resulted in the failure of the main mission after the satellite launch. Hence, HORYU-IV 
minimum success criteria would not have been satisfied. Moreover, the last phase of 
safety review was under preparation in parallel of plasma testing and failures record 
could not be as thorough as it was in the previous development phases. As a result, 
many failures related to software development were discovered and modifications were 
implemented accordingly, but those were not recorded and do not appear on Figure 4-5. 
Therefore, for HORYU-IV, plasma testing was very useful in revealing failures that 
would have impeded the mission minimum success and satellite reliability after launch. 
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Overall, in case the lean satellite program involves missions depending on the actual 
plasma conditions of the considered orbit, plasma testing seems to be helpful to 
unveiling failures and improving satellite reliability after launch. 
 
From FM AIT phase, there are two main lessons learned: 
1) even though the satellite was well-tested during EM phase, it is necessary to 
re-test the whole system as FM to ensure new components functionalities 
soundness. This is true even in the case that design or components batch are 
the same and this can take a non negligible amount of time. In HORYU-IV 
case, it took about 75 testing days; and 
2) thorough integrated testing of all functionalities of sub-systems critical to 
mission minimum success is necessary for the improvement of the satellite 
reliability after launch. 
 
Overall, HORYU-IV experimental data demonstrate that thorough short AIT 
cycles are critical for the discovery of failures and therefore for the satellite reliability 
improvement after launch. Moreover, space environment related tests are critical to 
unveil failures that could cost the satellite life within its first hours of operation after 
launch. Then, not only interfaces between two electrical sub-systems should be verified, 
but also interfaces between mechanical and electrical sub-systems should be carefully 
monitored and tested as early as possible in case modifications are required. 
 
Another interesting observation concerns the failures occurrence rate. From the 
failure rate (Equation 3-1), the time before failure (TBF) can be estimated using 
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Equation 4-1 [58] and the results are presented in Figure 4-6. 
 
 tr
1
TBF   
Equation 4-1. Definition of the time before failure 
 
 
Figure 4-6. HORYU-IV time before failure against the cumulative testing time 
 
Though the TBF varies during the project, it can be observed that overall the 
TBF is increasing. The TBF is best improved by about 37% between EM1 and EM2, 
whereas it remains almost constant between EM2 and FM at an average TBF of 22h and 
21h, respectively. On average, for HORYU-IV, a new failure occurred every 20h of AIT 
processes. Even when new interfaces are tested or when the tested system complexity 
increases, new failures were discovered as fast as every 16h. These results tend to 
indicate that, apart from the launch environment related tests, a minimum of 20h of AIT 
processes is necessary for a failure to emerge. 
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Finally, as a case in point, for HORYU-IV case the total AIT processes time 
spent during EM and FM accounted for almost 2/3 of the total development time for 
these two phases combined. 
 
4.1.2. Determination of shape and scale parameters 
In this section, the cumulative failure rate, C(t), against the cumulative testing 
time and the resulting Duane plot were plotted for the overall project development 
(Figure 4-7). As shown by Figure 4-7b, HORYU-IV experimental data can be fitted by a 
straight line with a negative slope, which indicates the satellite reliability improvement. 
From the obtained data and using Equation 4-2 [58], the scale parameter, λ, and the 
shape parameter, β, are estimated to be respectively 0.57 and 0.83 for HORYU-IV case. 
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Equation 4-2. Cumulative failure rate, C(t) 
 
With C(t), the cumulative failure rate; N(t), the cumulative number of failures; t, 
the time in hours; λ, the scale parameter; α, the growth parameter; and β=1-α, the shape 
parameter. 
Compared to data survey of small satellites from [18], the obtained shape 
parameter, which characterizes infant mortality seems high. However, it should be kept 
in mind that in HORYU-IV case it corresponds to data sets that were taken prior to 
launch, while the satellite can still be considered a repairable system. Therefore, many 
failures emerged and infant mortality of the system is indeed high.  
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4.1.3. System’s reliability 
As part of HORYU-IV lean philosophy approach, one of the management 
concerns was to ensure that the main mission had sufficient reliability to be successfully 
executed in space ensuring satellite’s minimum success criteria will be achieved. 
a) 
 
b) 
 
Figure 4-7. HORYU-IV cumulative failure rate against cumulative testing time (a) and 
resulting Duane plot (b) 
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Based on this management strategy, reliability block diagrams (RBD) of the 
satellite system, bus sub-systems, and payload sub-systems were established (Figure 
4-8). Overall, the RBDs are a representation of the different sub-systems interaction 
from a reliability standpoint. The arrow direction shows the sub-systems order to be 
able to achieve satellite minimum success requirements. The RBDs start on the left side 
with the most important sub-system from a reliability standpoint. For example, if we 
look at the whole system RBD, the first sub-system is structure. Without a reliable 
structure, the satellite cannot be launched; hence, the missions cannot be executed and 
the satellite’s minimum success criteria cannot be achieved. In other words, the loss of 
the structure will jeopardize the entire satellite and ensuring structure reliability is 
critical to the achievement of the satellite’s minimum success criteria. After structure, 
the most critical sub-system is EPS. Without a sufficient EPS reliability, power 
generation, storage, and supply cannot be ensured and electronics necessary to handling 
information internally through OBC or externally through COM or S-band cannot be 
turned ON and again it would jeopardize the entire satellite. The other sub-systems are 
similarly ordered until the least important sub-system from a reliability standpoint has 
been identified. 
It can be noticed that some sub-systems are displayed in parallel. This means 
that these sub-systems are equally important from a reliability standpoint. For example 
for the whole system RBD, COM and S-band are in parallel because from a system 
standpoint at least one of the two needs to work properly to ensure the satellite 
communication and therefore ensure the satellite’s minimum success criteria are 
achieved. However, in the bus sub-systems RBD, S-band and GS appear more important 
than COM because one of the minimum success criteria is to acquire a picture of a 
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discharge. This picture is too large to be downloaded by UHF and S-band, which offers 
a higher data speed rate, is required. Therefore, from a bus sub-systems standpoint, 
S-band and its associated GS are more critical to the achievement of the satellite’s 
minimum criteria than COM. 
The numbers in the bottom of each sub-system box indicate the sub-system 
contribution to failures at the end of EM1 (green), EM2 (blue), and FM (red) phases. 
These numbers come directly from the taxonomy analysis detailed in section 4.1.4. 
Based on these, the reliability, expressed as the probability of non failure of a 
considered sub-system can be estimated. Then, the reliability of the whole system, the 
bus sub-systems, and the payload sub-systems at the different AIT phases was 
calculated. The numerical results are shown in Table 4-1 and the evolution of the 
reliability against cumulative testing time is shown in Figure 4-9. 
 
a) Whole system 
 
65 | 148 
b) Bus sub-systems 
  
 
  
c) Payload sub-systems 
  
 
Figure 4-8. HORYU-IV reliability block diagrams of a) whole system, b) bus 
sub-systems, and c) payload sub-systems 
 
Table 4-1. HORYU-IV reliability after the different AIT phases for the whole system, 
bus sub-systems, and payload sub-systems 
 EM1 EM2 FM 
Testing time [h] 432 728 880 
Whole system reliability 0.31 0.18 0.35 
Bus sub-systems reliability 0.37 0.25 0.51 
Payload sub-systems reliability N/A 0.79 0.81 
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Figure 4-9. HORYU-IV reliability at the end of the different testing phases 
 
From Figure 4-9 and Table 4-1, it can be observed that the reliability of the 
whole system drops by 42% from EM1 and EM2 phases. This is driven by the bus 
sub-systems, and more specifically the structure. At EM2, structure and electronic 
related parts were assembled for the first time, which resulted in many structure driven 
interface failures discovery. This further demonstrates the importance of interfaces 
verifications not only between electrical interfaces, but also between mechanical and 
electronic interfaces. Overall, the whole system and bus sub-systems reliability was 
respectively improved by 13% and 38% between EM1 and FM AIT phases. For the 
payload sub-systems, the reliability was improved by 2.5% between EM2 and FM AIT 
phases. This points out that sufficient on-ground AIT processes can help improve 
system overall reliability prior to launch. 
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4.1.4. Failures taxonomy 
A taxonomy of the different failures observed during HORYU-IV project 
development is proposed in this section. In total, six categories were identified and 
Figure 4-10 present the results for the overall project as well as for each development 
phase. 
For the overall project (Figure 4-10a-b), about 70% of the failures were driven 
within similar proportions by electronics design, structural elements design, and 
software failures. However, when looking at the project different stages of development, 
it appears that EM1 was driven at 43% by failures in the design of electronics (Figure 
4-10c-d). Then, there was a shift in the failures origin and EM2 was driven at 71% by 
failures in the design of the structural elements since this development phase 
corresponds to the first time the PCBs and different elements were assembled together 
to realize the satellite EM version (Figure 4-10e-f). For FM, there was a new shift in the 
failures type and software failures represented 39% of the total number of recorded 
failure for this phase (Figure 4-10g-h). This is logical since after the assembly of the FM 
satellite it is very risky to modify hardware and HORYU-IV philosophy was to ensure 
hardware functionalities prior to FM assembly, whereas software could be modified 
until the satellite delivery. 
Moreover, it can be noted that for the whole system, workmanship-type failures 
accounted for about 10%. Those were especially discovered during EM1 and FM phases. 
To prevent workmanship-type failures, the satellite project should not rely on one’s 
knowledge, but have clearly defined checklists and proper documentation. Yet, the 
reader should note that only critical documentation should be identified to limit 
unnecessary documents, spare time, prevent “death by administration”, and favor 
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efficient knowledge transfer. 
It is important to note that, though payloads or sub-systems other than OBC, 
EPS, or COM seem to be minor failures driver, the failures that emerged during their 
AIT processes were nonetheless critical and their discovery undoubtedly contributed to 
the achievement of the satellite minimum success. Therefore, AIT processes should not 
be overlooked and overall it is my opinion that when lean satellite developers have to 
chose between different AIT scenarios, they should chose the scenario that is most 
suitable for achieving the satellite minimum success even if that choice might mean to 
put aside or even giving up on some other functionalities. 
 
a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
 
d) 
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e) 
 
f) 
 
g) 
 
h) 
 
Figure 4-10. HORYU-IV failures taxonomy for a-b) overall system, c-d) EM1, e-f) 
EM2, and g-h) FM 
 
4.2. Simulations results and discussion 
4.2.1. Time considerations 
Simulations results examples for the seven AIT processes with initial testing 
time, Ti, of 20h, 50h, 100h, and 200h are presented in Figure 4-11. From these results, it 
can be observed that most of failures are discovered at the early stage of testing for each 
considered AIT process. This is in agreement with the trend that was observed with the 
experimental results (Figure 4-1). 
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Figure 4-11. Example of simulations results comparison for the seven AIT processes 
with different initial testing time, Ti=20h, 50h, 100h, or 200h 
 
It appears that for any decided initial testing time, the actual average total testing 
due to failures discovery will be about 11 times longer for seven AIT processes. For 
example, for a decided initial testing time of 200h, the actual total testing time is 2061h. 
With the assumption that testing is carried out for 8 hours per business day, i.e. 22 days 
are considered in a month, these 2061 hours of testing can be translated into a minimum 
of 12 months of AIT processes. Considering lean satellite programs are typically 
developed over 2 years, this means half of the program should be dedicated to AIT 
processes. Though this might be feasible in some lean satellite programs, this might be 
too constraining in others and the decision on initial testing time based on a trade-off 
with desired reliability after launch would be more suitable as shown in section 4.2.2. 
 
Results presented in Figure 4-11 only take into account failure modes and 
therefore only show failure modes impact on AIT phases. When failures criticality is 
also taken into account, the impact of failures discovery on the overall project schedule 
can be studied. This is shown in Figure 4-12. 
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Figure 4-12. Example of simulations results comparison for project total time with 
different initial testing time, Ti=20h, 50h, 100h, or 200h and with 7 AIT processes 
 
From Figure 4-12, it appears that independently of the initial AIT processes time 
chosen, the number of total failures discovered at the end of the lean satellite project is 
of the same order. If the AIT processes time is increased by 10 times from 20h to 200h, 
only 1.7 more failures are discovered on average. However, since the failures reparation 
time is taken into account, the total project time becomes on average 2.5 times longer, 
which can be very constraining for some lean satellite programs.
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In Figure 4-13, the distribution of the total testing times, TtAIT, obtained for each of the 1000 runs is presented for the different 
initial testing times, Ti. Details of the numerical values for the different data sets are given in Appendix C. 
 
a) 
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b) 
 
c) 
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d) 
 
 
Figure 4-13. Total testing time distribution over the 1000 runs simulation for a) Ti = 20h, b) Ti = 50h, c) Ti = 100h, and d) Ti = 200h 
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4.2.2. Reliability consideration 
For the reliability after launch, each AIT process was run 1000 times and the 
resulting average values of λ0last, λilast, βilast, β0last, θrlast, TAITi, and TtAIT were used for 
its calculation. The results are presented in Figure 4-14 and the evolution of the 
reliability for different times after launch depending on the total AIT processes time is 
presented in Figure 4-15. 
 
 
Figure 4-14. Comparison of reliability simulations results from 1000 simulation runs for 
each of the seven AIT processes with different initial testing times, Ti 
 
 
Figure 4-15. Reliability after launch from 1000 simulation runs for different times 
against initial testing time, Ti = 20h, 50h, 100h, or 200h 
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The simulation results of reliability after launch show that when the initial AIT 
processes time is increased by 10 times, the reliability at one month after launch can be 
improved by 11 times. Similarly, when the initial time is increased by 5 times and 2.5 
times, the reliability at 1 month after launch is respectively improved by 10 times and 6 
times. From these data combined with Figure 4-11 and Figure 4-12 data, it is clear that 
increasing AIT processes time is beneficial to improve reliability of the satellite after 
launch. Yet, a too large increase of the initial AIT processes time can impede the project 
overall development time without clearly improving the system from a reliability 
standpoint as shown in Figure 4-15. 
These observations further point out that for a lean satellite program to be able to 
achieve a minimum desired reliability for a certain time after launch, a resulting 
minimum time should be spent for AIT processes. Yet, drastically increasing the initial 
AIT processes time will not drastically increase the reliability of the system. Each lean 
satellite program developer should find the best trade-off between cost, development 
time, and reliability depending on the considered program resources. 
It should be noted that only the qualitative relationship between the reliability 
and the initial testing time, Ti, is of interest and the quantitative values of the reliability 
should be taken with caution. The shape and scale parameters, βi and λi, used to 
calculate the reliability are obtained from the AIT processes and much more stress is put 
during on-ground testing than the satellite will endure during its orbital lifetime, thus in 
actual case, the scale parameter, λ, after launch should be smaller than the final scale 
parameter obtained at the end of the seven AIT processes and so should be the shape 
parameter, β. 
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Numerical values of the total number of failures discovered, total testing time, 
and reliability at different times after launch for the different initial testing times are 
given in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2. Simulations results summary from 1000 simulation runs and for different 
initial testing times, Ti 
Initial testing time, Ti [h], per AIT process 20 50 100 200 
Average of total number of failures 
discovered for the seven AIT processes 
combined 
57.8 75.4 87.6 100.1 
Average of total testing time [h] for the 
seven AIT processes combined 
236.60 590.52 1133.19 2166.58 
Average reliability at 48h after launch 0.716 0.935 0.980 0.994 
Average reliability at 168h (1 week) after 
launch 
0.415 0.825 0.939 0.982 
Average reliability at 720h (1 month) after 
launch 
0.096 0.569 0.823 0.940 
Average reliability at 2160h (3 months) after 
launch 
0.009 0.313 0.659 0.871 
Average reliability at 4320h (6 months) after 
launch 
8.13×10
-4
 0.165 0.521 0.803 
Average reliability at 6480h (9 months) after 
launch 
1.08×10
-4
 0.098 0.431 0.752 
Average reliability at 8760h (1 year) after 
launch 
1.65×10
-5
 0.060 0.361 0.708 
Maximum time on-orbit for R = 0.5 [h] 121 979 4760 26852 
Maximum time on-orbit for R = 0.6 [h] 81 625 2955 16401 
Maximum time on-orbit for R = 0.7 [h] 52 377 1712 9221 
Maximum time on-orbit for R = 0.8 [h] 30 202 867 4429 
Maximum time on-orbit for R = 0.9 [h] 13 81 319 1473 
Maximum time on-orbit for R = 0.95 [h] 6 36 134 567 
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4.2.3. Cost considerations 
In addition to time and reliability, cost is another important factor to take into 
account for lean satellite programs and based on HORYU-IV experience, cost drivers 
per sub-system were identified (Table 4-3). 
 
Table 4-3. HORYU-IV average cost per main sub-systems components 
Sub-system Component Average cost/unit [JPY]
a
 
Structure Satellite part
b
 20,000 
Screws, washers, etc 200 
Surface treatment 15,000 
Mother board Solar cells type A
c
 126,000
d
 
Batteries
c
 
6,000/pack 
(1 pack = 6 cells) 
PCB
e
 240,000 
Transmitter 405,000 
Receiver 262,000 
Consulting 723,600/month 
GS S-band ground station 26,000,000
f
 
Consulting 70,000/month 
L-band ground station 3,990,000
f
 
S-band/SNG Transmitter 1,000,000 
Patch antenna 50,000 
PCB
e
 120,000 
Thermal Thermal sensor 13,000 
Sheet heater 12,000 
Black paint 25,000 
L-band Patch antenna 220,000 
Transmitter 500,000 
HVSA Solar cells type B
c
 100,000/panel
g
 
Solar cells type C 200,000/panel
h
 
PCB
e
 90,000 
OBO PCB
e
 150,000 
AVC Camera
i
 80,000 
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AVC PCB
e
 200,000 
AODS/ 
CAM 
PCB
e
 180,000 
Camera
i
 20,000 
GPS receiver 440,000 
GPS antenna
j
 45,000 
Power divider 45,000 
Gyro sensor 15,000 
Sun sensor
k
 4,000 
Hysteresis damper 10,000 
Big apple PCB
e
 180,000 
Interfaces RTV 100,000/100g 
Harness, connectors 10,000 
Others Air table 220,000 
Rate table 1,350,000 
Software license 570,000/year 
Thermal vacuum test (LN2) 300,000/month 
Satellite transportation
l
 335,000/1 way 
Satellite mock-up 410,000 
a
Values are rounded 
b
Average cost for the manufacturing of 1 part of HORYU-IV structure, not the whole 
satellite structure 
c
Includes transportation, additional work such as assembly of different elements, etc 
d
There are 34 cells mounted on the satellite 
e
Includes electronic components purchase, mounting, soldering, and PCB 
manufacturing 
f
Total development cost (did not exist at Kyutech prior to HORYU-IV project) 
g
There are five panels mounted on the satellite 
h
There are two panels mounted on the satellite 
i
There are two cameras mounted on the satellite 
j
There are two GPS antennas mounted on the satellite 
k
There are six sun sensors mounted on the satellite 
l
Transportation by truck, 1 way ≈ 1000km 
 
From this evaluation, induced cost depending on the AIT process considered was 
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estimated (Table 4-4). From this, it can be seen that, as expected, the cost increases as 
the satellite goes through the different AIT processes since more and more elements are 
involved. Overall, the development cost induced at the end of the 7-th AIT process is 
nearly two times more important than the cost induced for the 1-st AIT process. 
 
Table 4-4. Minimum cost induced/AIT process based on HORYU-IV development cost 
AIT 
Min. induced cost 
[MJPY]/Ti 
Cost drivers 
1) Electrical 
performance 
verifications (flat 
satellite) 
20h 3.728 - Batteries 
- Electronic componentsa 
- Transmitters 
- Receiver 
- Consulting (mother board) 
- Cameras 
50h 4.490 
100h 5.476 
200h 7.073 
2) Structure assembly 
20h 
10.633 
- Structure 
- Solar cells 
- Batteries 
- Transmitters 
- Receiver 
- Antennas 
- S-band/SNG 
- Thermal 
- L-band 
- HVSA 
- OBO 
- AVC 
- AODS 
- Big apple 
- Interfaces 
50h 
100h 
200h 
3) Electrical 
performance 
verifications 
(assembled satellite) 
20h 11.941 - Same as above 
- Consultingb (mother board) 50h 12.446 
100h 12.960 
200h 13.685 
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4) Thermal vacuum test 20h 10.814 - Same as above (no 
consulting) 
- LN2 
50h 10.884 
4) Thermal vacuum test 100h 10.947 
 200h 11.049 
5) Plasma test 20h 11.941 - Same as 3) 
50h 12.446 
100h 12.960 
200h 13.685 
6) Software 
performance 
verifications 
20h 13.013 - Same as 3) 
- GSb 50h 13.848 
100h 14.772 
200h 16.113 
7) End-to-end missions 
simulation test 
20h 14.293 - Same as 6) 
50h 15.625 
100h 17.043 
200h 19.078 
a
Estimated to represent half the PCB cost 
b
Consulting and total S-band and L-band ground stations cost were evaluated for 1h 
 
Though HORYU-IV was a university based satellite project, it was a 
semi-professional project involving engineers and researchers. The number of the 
professionals involved during the project depending on the different AIT processes and 
their corresponding contributing cost for the project are given in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5. Induced personnel cost for each AIT process 
AIT 
Number of professionals 
Induced personnel 
project cost [MJPY]/Ti 
Engineer 
(1500JPY/h) 
Researcher 
(2500JPY/h) 
1) Electrical performance 
verifications (flat satellite) 
1 1 
20h 1.338 
50h 2.080 
100h 3.039 
200h 4.593 
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2) Structure assembly 2 0 
20h 0.973 
50h 1.378 
2) Structure assembly 2 0 
100h 1.705 
200h 2.275 
3) Electrical performance 
verifications (assembled 
satellite) 
1 1 
20h 1.273 
50h 1.764 
100h 2.265 
200h 2.970 
4) Thermal vacuum test 1 1 
20h 1.273 
50h 1.766 
100h 2.213 
200h 2.930 
5) Plasma test 0 1 
20h 0.805 
50h 1.107 
100h 1.383 
200h 1.825 
6) Software performance 
verifications 
0 1 
20h 0.794 
50h 1.072 
100h 1.381 
200h 1.828 
7) End-to-end missions 
simulation test 
0 1 
20h 0.779 
50h 1.081 
100h 1.382 
200h 1.803 
 
In Figure 4-16, plots of cumulative costs against the cumulative project time are 
shown for the different initial testing times, Ti. The development cost and personnel cost 
plots respectively correspond to the costs as presented in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5. The 
total cost plot corresponds to the sum of the development and personnel costs. As 
expected and aforementioned, the total cost from the 1-st AIT process to the 7-th AIT 
process increases. For any of the Ti considered, the project cost at the end of the 7-th 
AIT process is three times the cost at the end of the 1-st AIT process. Moreover, if the 
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initial testing time, Ti, is increased by 10 times from 20h to 200h, the project overall 
total cost will be increased by more than 80%. However, if Ti is increases by 2.5, from 
20h to 50h, the overall total cost will only be increased by 24%. 
Another observation is that for high initial AIT processes time, personnel cost 
becomes the driver of the project overall cost. For university-based satellite programs, 
where the main workforce is students, this might not be a problem. However, for 
commercial entities developing lean satellites, the personnel cost associated with testing 
might lead the project toward cost overruns and critical tests might be overlooked to 
contain the testing cost overruns. This is not a desirable outcome and one option to 
prevent personnel cost overruns while performing sufficient testing could be to develop 
smart automated testing for different development phases. 
 
Overall, the findings point out that AIT processes should be performed optimally 
and efficiently not only to prevent lean satellite program overrunning, but also 
unnecessary cost. 
 
It should be noted, that as compared to a lean satellite developed by a private 
company or space agency, the number of engineers and researchers involved in 
HORYU-IV project is minimum and results presented are for illustration only. More 
data should be collected on other types of lean satellite projects before making any final 
conclusions. Moreover, the hourly cost evaluation is somewhat low because junior 
engineers and researchers were employed. 
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a) 
 
b) 
 
c) 
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d) 
 
Figure 4-16. Plots of the cumulative cost against the cumulative project time for a) Ti = 
20h, b) Ti = 50h, c) Ti = 100h, and d) Ti = 200h 
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CHAPTER 5 – Research Outlook 
 
In the previous chapters, multi-criteria were assessed through experimental data and 
computations. From the assessment outcomes, different recommendations were 
established for the optimization of lean satellite programs managerial decision-making. 
However, there are limitations in the current research and these are addressed in the first 
part of this chapter along with their countermeasures. In the second part of this chapter, 
it is shown how the results obtained can be used, and be useful, in a professional 
manner through the proposal of a practical application. 
 
5.1. Current work limitations and countermeasures 
Within this research time frame, data from only one university based lean satellite 
program could be used and analyzed. This is a good starting point to draft the trends 
lean satellite programs might follow, but this is insufficient to establish general 
conclusions for any lean satellite program considered. There is therefore a need for 
inputs from other lean satellite programs. Those additional inputs should not only come 
from university based lean satellite programs, but also from private and governmental 
entities from all over the world to take into account the diversity of development 
philosophies. 
As a countermeasure to the lack of case studies in this research current form, I 
propose to lean satellite programs managers to fill in during the AIT phases a simple 
and easy to use “failures track sheet” gathering data on:  
 AIT processes denomination, 
 AIT processes dates, 
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 failure discovery date, 
 failure description, 
 failure type, 
 sub-system(s) associated to failure, 
 number of people involved in AIT processes. 
The entries listed above are non-exhaustive and should be refined according to the 
users’ needs. An example of a “failures track sheet” is given in Figure 5-1 and in 
Appendix D, the actual failures information gathered during HORYU-IV project AIT 
phases are presented. 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Example of “failures track sheet” for lean satellite programs 
 
As a complement to the “failures track sheet”, it would also be of interest to establish 
a database of the lessons learned proper to the “LeanSat community”. NASA 
established a lessons learned database [60], but it only concerns NASA related projects 
and it cannot be updated by personnel outside the space agency. 
For lean satellite programs, I believe the database should be open and accessible to 
any person registered to the “LeanSat community”. Upon registration, the registered 
person could add lesson(s) learned related to his/her project(s) and make modifications 
to his/her previous entries. Regarding the database organization, entries could be 
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divided depending on the entity the lean satellite program is carried on: private, 
government, or university. The entries could also be divided depending on the 
sub-system(s) associated with the lessons learned. 
At the beginning, for the framework definition of the practical establishment of the 
“LeanSat” database, it could be part of the continuous work of the IAA Study Group 
4.18 members. Then, the database organization and day-to-day management could be 
taken over by a private entity or individual. 
An example of lessons learned extracted from the HORYU-IV project is presented in 
Appendix E. 
 
Through the data compilation from the “failures track sheets” and the establishment 
of an open “LeanSat” lessons learned database, the trends presented in this research 
could be refined and the simulations could be improved from a qualitative and 
quantitative standpoint. 
 
5.2. Proposal for a practical professional use of the research outcomes 
From the refinement of the trends and simulations improvement, a model dedicated 
to lean satellite programs and integrating cost, schedule, and reliability could be 
developed. 
Different tools are already available to satellite programs managers. Some are 
dedicated to reliability engineering [61] or cost estimation [62] and others can be used 
as assistant for scheduling [63, 64]. However, none of them shows the interdependence 
between those parameters. Moreover, their approach is mostly based on data from 
traditional satellites experiences and is therefore not well-suited for lean satellite 
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programs. 
In the last 10 years, a few researches focused on developing risk management tools 
dedicated to lean satellites, but due to the scarce number of information about such 
programs, their development and use are still at their infancy stage. In 2007, Deems [65] 
tackled the importance of risk management and how it can be more efficiently utilized 
within university based satellite programs through the establishment of master logic 
diagrams to identify failure modes. However, as it is pointed out by the author, there are 
no quantitative risk assessments. Moreover, the interdependence between risk 
assessment, cost, schedule, or other parameters is not evaluated. In 2015, these two 
main drawbacks were tackled by Brumbaugh Gamble [66], who developed two risk 
management tools: CubeSat Risk Analysis and CubeSat Decision Advisor. With these 
two tools, mission risks and their associated mitigation techniques can be evaluated in 
terms of cost, personnel, and time resources. However, these tools are based on only 52 
satellite projects limited to CubeSats and the tools outputs are the same regardless of 
whether a university, a private company, or a government satellite was considered. 
There is a clear international need for an integrated management tool dedicated to 
lean satellites. Based on data collection from the “LeanSat community”, the work 
established by Brumbaugh Gamble could be a good starting point for such tool. First, 
data from more various satellite program types could be gathered and analyzed to tailor 
risk assessments specific to each satellite program type. Then based on this research’s 
outcomes, interdependence not only between cost and schedule, but also between AIT 
processes time and reliability could be quantitatively evaluated. 
 
From the development of such an integrated management tool, we could expect to 
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rectify a lean satellite program strategy during early development stages eventually 
leading to more reliable, cost-effective, and efficient satellites. 
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CHAPTER 6 – Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The research was led according to a two-step action plan. In the first step, actual 
experimental data from an actual satellite program were collected, analyzed, and 
interpreted. The main observations from the experimental data are listed below. 
 Half to 2/3 of failures are discovered at an early stage of the assembly, 
integration, and testing processes. 
 Integration of new sub-systems, electrical or mechanical, increases the failure 
rate and thorough interfaces verification and testing is therefore critical. 
 Modifications of the assembly, integration, and testing strategy, such as putting 
emphasis on specific sub-systems, increase the failure rate. 
 On average, a failure was discovered every 20h of the assembly, integration, and 
testing processes. 
 From the Duane plot, HORYU-IV shape parameter was calculated to be 0.83, 
which indicates a positive reliability growth thanks to the assembly, integration, 
and testing processes the satellite underwent. 
 From the establishment of reliability block diagrams, it was calculated that 
overall HORYU-IV system reliability was improved by 13% between EM1 and 
FM. 
 Upon establishment of the failures taxonomy, it appeared that in its initial 
development phase, HORYU-IV failures were mainly due to mistakes in the 
electrical design and mainly driven by OBC and COM. Then, failures that 
emerged during the intermediate development phase were mainly due to 
mistakes in the mechanical design. Finally, in the last development phase, 
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failures were mainly due to software tuning, which was mostly driven by OBC. 
Overall, OBC and structure were identified as the main drivers for HORYU-IV 
infant mortality prior to launch. 
 In the case of HORYU-IV, the total time spent for assembly, integration, and 
testing processes during EM and FM accounted for almost 2/3 of the total 
development time for these two phases combined. 
 
The second step of the research action plan was to conduct simulations based on a 
well-established methodology to obtain trends on the interactions between assembly, 
integration, and testing processes time, project schedule, reliability, and cost. The main 
conclusions from the establishment of these trends are listed below. 
 As it was observed with the experimental data, most of failures are discovered at 
an early stage of the assembly, integration, and testing processes. 
 Reliability at 1 month after launch is improved from 6 to 11 times if the initial 
assembly, integration, and testing processes time is increased from 2.5 to 10 
times. 
 When failure criticality is taken into account and failures reparation time is thus 
accounted for, the overall project becomes 2.5 times longer when the initial 
assembly, integration, and testing processes time is increased by 10 times, from 
20h to 200h. 
 When the initial assembly, integration, and testing processes time is increased by 
10 times, from 20h to 200h, only 1.7 times more failures are discovered. 
 A long initial assembly, integration, and testing processes time can impede the 
project overall development time without clearly improving the system from a 
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reliability standpoint. 
 For any of the initial assembly, integration, and testing processes times 
considered, the project overall cost at the end of the 7-th AIT process is three 
times the cost at the end of the 1-st AIT process. 
 In HORYU-IV case, if the initial assembly, integration, and testing processes 
time is increased by 10 times from 20h to 200h, the project overall total cost is 
increased by more than 80%. 
 In HORYU-IV case, if the initial assembly, integration, and testing processes 
time is increased by 2.5, from 20h to 50h, the overall total cost is increased by 
less than 25%. 
 A drastic increase of the initial assembly, integration, and testing processes time 
does not result in a drastic increase of the system reliability after launch, but 
does drastically increase the project cost. 
 
From the experimental and simulation data observations, recommendations as 
described below can be established. 
1) Even for a lean program with limited resources, a minimum time should be spent 
on assembly, integration, and testing processes to discover failures that could 
drive satellite to its premature death on-orbit. 
2) From a time standpoint, it is worthy for lean satellite developers to allocate 
sufficient testing time to prove the soundness of a sub-system individually prior 
to its integration with other sub-systems. 
3) Interfaces between sub-systems should be verified as early as possible during the 
development phase. 
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4) For lean satellite reliability growth, space environment testing, especially thermal 
vacuum test, is critical to identify major failures that could only emerged when 
the satellite is exposed to simulated on-orbit conditions and should therefore be 
performed even for a small time period. 
5) Testing of sub-systems critical to mission minimum success is necessary for the 
improvement of the satellite reliability. 
6) Favoring local manufacturers can be advantageous from a time and financial 
standpoint. 
7) When possible, long lead items should be ordered in sufficient quantity to 
guaranty a quick response in case of failure and prevent excess of non-valuable 
waiting time. 
8) For the prevention of workmanship-type failures, the project should not rely on 
an individual’s knowledge. Instead, critical and proper documentation should be 
identified and established. 
9) Assembly, integration, and testing processes should ensure functions critical to 
the success of the satellite’s minimum success criteria. 
10) During assembly, integration, and testing processes, cost overruns due to 
personnel cost could be prevented by developing smart automated processes. 
11) The most suitable testing strategy for achieving satellite minimum success should 
be adopted even though it might mean to give up on some other functions. 
12) Overall, assembly, integration, and testing processes should be performed 
optimally and efficiently not only to prevent lean satellite program overrunning, 
but also unnecessary cost. 
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The research outcomes intend to be used as guidance by lean satellite developers and 
managers for better planning of assembly, integration, and testing processes and 
resources allocation in order to develop more reliable, and therefore more sustainable, 
lean satellite systems independently of the constraints on a given program. 
Yet, it is important to note that the reader should not extract final quantitative 
conclusions from the presented work since the data collected concern one satellite 
project only. Further data from different lean satellite programs are necessary to 
complement and improve the presented work. Two proposals for collecting the data are 
the “failures track sheet” and the “LeanSat community” lessons learned database. 
Finally, from the data collection of the various lean satellite programs developers, an 
integrated management tool including qualitative and quantitative assessment of criteria 
such as time, cost, reliability and their interdependence could be developed. The 
development and use of such tool will eventually foster more reliable, cost-effective, 
and efficient lean satellite programs. 
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APPENDIX A – MATLAB Program for Testing Time and Project Time 
Estimations 
1- %Note: unlike in the manuscript, the random number 'ηi1' and 'ηi2' are defined as 
'randomi1' and 'randomi2' in the program 
2-   
3- M = 1; 
4- AIT = 7; %Define to number of AITs to take into consideration 
5-   
6- A = 1; 
7- B = 0.001118; %=0.01*lambdar*betar*T^((betar)-1) 
8-   
9- while M<=AIT 
10- N = 1; 
11- Run = 1000; %Define number of simulation runs 
12- T = 200; %Define initial testing time, Ti 
13-   
14- lambda0 = A; %Last average lambda0 obtained after the N simulation runs 
15- thetar = B; %Last average thetar obtained after the N simulation runs 
16-   
17- matAllFail = []; 
18- matAllFailA = []; 
19- matAllFailB1 = []; 
20- matAllFailB2 = []; 
21- matAllFailB3 = []; 
22- matAllFailB4 = []; 
23- matAllFailSingle = []; 
24- matAllFailCross = []; 
25- matAllFailRand = []; 
26- matLambda02 = []; 
27- matLambda2 = []; 
28- matLambdaA2 = []; 
29- matLambdaB12 = []; 
30- matLambdaB22 = []; 
31- matLambdaB32 = []; 
32- matLambdaB42 = []; 
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33- matProjectT = []; 
34- matProjectTt = []; 
35- matTAIT = []; 
36- matThetar2 = []; 
37- matTimeA = []; 
38- matTimeB1 = []; 
39- matTimeB2 = []; 
40- matTimeB3 = []; 
41- matTimeB4 = []; 
42- matTotSingle = []; 
43- matTtAIT = []; 
44-   
45- testN = []; 
46- testTstep = []; 
47-   
48- while N<=Run 
49-   
50-     lambdar = 1; 
51-     betar = 0.5; 
52-      
53-     if M == 1 
54-         lambda0 = 1; 
55-         thetar = 0.01*lambdar*betar*T^((betar)-1); 
56-         TtAIT = 0; 
57-     else 
58-         lambda0 = A; 
59-         thetar = B; 
60-         TtAIT = C; 
61-     end 
62-   
63-     lambda = 1; 
64-     lambdaA = 1; 
65-     lambdaB1 = 1; 
66-     lambdaB2 = 1; 
67-     lambdaB3 = 1; 
68-     lambdaB4 = 1; 
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69-     beta0 = 0.5; 
70-     beta = 0.5; 
71-     betaA = 0.5; 
72-     betaB1 = 0.5; 
73-     betaB2 = 0.5; 
74-     betaB3 = 0.5; 
75-     betaB4 = 0.5; 
76-     cumFail = 0; 
77-     deltaTA = 0; 
78-     deltaTB1 = 0; 
79-     deltaTB2 = 0; 
80-     deltaTB3 = 0; 
81-     deltaTB4 = 0; 
82-     deltaTs = 0; 
83-     deltaTr = 0; 
84-     epsilon0 = 0.5; 
85-     epsilon = 0.5; 
86-     epsilonA = 0.5; 
87-     epsilonB1 = 0.5; 
88-     epsilonB2 = 0.5; 
89-     epsilonB3 = 0.5; 
90-     epsilonB4 = 0.5; 
91-     epsilonr = 0.5; 
92-     failA = 0; 
93-     failAITany = 0; 
94-     failAITonly = 0; 
95-     failB1 = 0; 
96-     failB2 = 0; 
97-     failB3 = 0; 
98-     failB4 = 0; 
99-     failRandom = 0; 
100- Tstep = 0; 
101- timeA1 = 0; 
102- timeB11 = 0; 
103- timeB21 = 0; 
104- timeB31 = 0; 
106 | 148 
105- timeB41 = 0; 
106-    
107- cumFail1 = []; 
108- failAITany1 = []; 
109- failAITonly1 = []; 
110- failRandom1 = []; 
111- matLambda01 = []; 
112- matLambda1 = []; 
113- matLambdaA1 = []; 
114- matLambdaB11 = []; 
115- matLambdaB21 = []; 
116- matLambdaB31 = []; 
117- matLambdaB41 = []; 
118- matLambdar = []; 
119- matThetar1 = []; 
120- R1 = []; 
121- rand1 = []; 
122- rand2 = []; 
123- rand3 = []; 
124- saveDeltaTA = []; 
125- saveDeltaTB1 = []; 
126- saveDeltaTB2 = []; 
127- saveDeltaTB3 = []; 
128- saveDeltaTB4 = []; 
129- saveDeltaTr = []; 
130- saveDeltaTs = []; 
131- saveF1 = []; 
132- saveF2 = []; 
133- saveF3 = []; 
134- saveF4 = []; 
135- saveF5 = []; 
136- saveF6 = []; 
137- saveFailA = []; 
138- saveFailB1 = []; 
139- saveFailB2 = []; 
140- saveFailB3 = []; 
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141- saveFailB4 = []; 
142- saveR = []; 
143- saveRandom1 = []; 
144- saveRandom21 = []; 
145- saveRandom22 = []; 
146- saveRandom23 = []; 
147- saveT1 = []; 
148- saveT2 = []; 
149- saveT3 = []; 
150- saveT4 = []; 
151- saveTimeA1 = []; 
152- saveTimeB11 = []; 
153- saveTimeB21 = []; 
154- saveTimeB31 = []; 
155- saveTimeB41 = []; 
156- saveTimeProj = []; 
157- saveTtot1 = []; 
158- saveTtot2 = []; 
159- saveTtot3 = []; 
160- saveTtot4 = []; 
161- Tstep1 = []; 
162-     
163- while Tstep<=T 
164-  
165-     Rsingle = exp(-(lambda).*(Tstep+deltaTs+deltaTr).^(beta)); 
166-     Rcross = 
exp(-(lambda0).*(Tstep+deltaTs+deltaTr+TtAIT).^(beta0)+(lambda0).*(TtAIT).^(b
eta0)); 
167-     Rrandom= exp(-(thetar)*(Tstep+deltaTs+deltaTr)); 
168-     R = Rsingle*Rcross*Rrandom; 
169-     R1 = [R1,R]; 
170-      
171-     random1 = rand(1,1); 
172-     rand1 = [rand1,random1]; 
173-      
174-     if random1>R 
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175-         saveT1 = [saveT1,Tstep]; 
176-         saveRandom1 = [saveRandom1,random1]; 
177-         saveR = [saveR,R]; 
178-          
179-         cumFail = cumFail + 1; 
180-         cumFail1 = [cumFail1,cumFail]; 
181-           
182-         timeProj = Tstep + deltaTr + deltaTs + deltaTA + deltaTB1 + 
deltaTB2 + deltaTB3 + deltaTB4; %Cumulative time until last failure, not until test 
ends 
183-         saveTimeProj = [saveTimeProj,timeProj]; 
184-         Ttot1 = Tstep + deltaTr + deltaTs; 
185-         saveTtot1 = [saveTtot1,Ttot1]; 
186-          
187-         %To determine failure category 
188-         F1 = 
((lambda).*(beta).*(Ttot1).^((beta)-1))/((lambda).*(beta).*(Ttot1).^((beta)-1)+(lamb
da0).*(beta0).*(Ttot1+TtAIT).^((beta0)-1)+thetar); 
189-         saveF1 = [saveF1,F1]; 
190-         F2 = 
((lambda).*(beta).*(Ttot1).^((beta)-1)+(lambda0).*(beta0).*(Ttot1+TtAIT).^((beta0
)-1))/((lambda).*(beta).*(Ttot1).^((beta)-1)+(lambda0).*(beta0).*(Ttot1+TtAIT).^((
beta0)-1)+thetar); 
191-         saveF2 = [saveF2,F2]; 
192-   
193-         random2 = rand(1,1); 
194-         rand2 = [rand2,random2]; 
195-          
196-         %Failure common to AIT No.1 only (single-AIT failure mode) 
197-         if random2<F1 
198-             saveT2 = [saveT2,Tstep]; 
199-             saveRandom21 = [saveRandom21,random2]; 
200-              
201-             failAITonly = failAITonly + 1; 
202-             failAITonly1 = [failAITonly1,failAITonly]; 
203-              
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204-             lambda = lambda*epsilon; 
205-              matLambda1 = [matLambda1,lambda]; 
206-              
207-             deltaTs = deltaTs + 1; 
208-             saveDeltaTs = [saveDeltaTs,deltaTs]; 
209-              
210-             Ttot2 = Tstep + deltaTs + deltaTr; 
211-             saveTtot2 = [saveTtot2,Ttot2]; 
212-              
213-             if Tstep == 0 
214-                 Tstep = 0; 
215-             else 
216-                 Tstep = Tstep - 1; 
217-             end 
218-              
219-             %To determine failure type (A, B1, B2, B3, or B4) 
220-             F3 = 
((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA)-1))/((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA
)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1).*(Ttot2).^((betaB1)-1)+(lambdaB2).*(betaB2).*(Ttot2).
^((betaB2)-1)+(lambdaB3).*(betaB3).*(Ttot2).^((betaB3)-1)+(lambdaB4).*(betaB4
).*(Ttot2).^((betaB4)-1)); 
221-             saveF3 = [saveF3,F3]; 
222-             F4 = 
((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1).*(Ttot2).^((beta
B1)-1))/((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1).*(Ttot2)
.^((betaB1)-1)+(lambdaB2).*(betaB2).*(Ttot2).^((betaB2)-1)+(lambdaB3).*(betaB3
).*(Ttot2).^((betaB3)-1)+(lambdaB4).*(betaB4).*(Ttot2).^((betaB4)-1)); 
223-             saveF4 = [saveF4,F4]; 
224-             F5 = 
((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1).*(Ttot2).^((beta
B1)-1)+(lambdaB2).*(betaB2).*(Ttot2).^((betaB2)-1))/((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2
).^((betaA)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1).*(Ttot2).^((betaB1)-1)+(lambdaB2).*(betaB2
).*(Ttot2).^((betaB2)-1)+(lambdaB3).*(betaB3).*(Ttot2).^((betaB3)-1)+(lambdaB4)
.*(betaB4).*(Ttot2).^((betaB4)-1)); 
225-             saveF5 = [saveF5,F5]; 
226-             F6 = 
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((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1).*(Ttot2).^((beta
B1)-1)+(lambdaB2).*(betaB2).*(Ttot2).^((betaB2)-1)+(lambdaB3).*(betaB3).*(Ttot
2).^((betaB3)-1))/((lambdaA).*(betaA).*(Ttot2).^((betaA)-1)+(lambdaB1).*(betaB1
).*(Ttot2).^((betaB1)-1)+(lambdaB2).*(betaB2).*(Ttot2).^((betaB2)-1)+(lambdaB3)
.*(betaB3).*(Ttot2).^((betaB3)-1)+(lambdaB4).*(betaB4).*(Ttot2).^((betaB4)-1)); 
227-             saveF6 = [saveF6,F6]; 
228-              
229-             random3 = rand(1,1); 
230-             rand3 = [rand3,random3]; 
231-              
232-             %Type A single-AIT failure 
233-             if random3<F3 
234-                 failA = failA + 1; 
235-                 saveFailA = [saveFailA,failA]; 
236-                  
237-                 lambdaA = lambdaA*epsilonA; 
238-                 matLambdaA1 = [matLambdaA1,lambdaA]; 
239-                  
240-                 timeA1 = timeA1; 
241-                 saveTimeA1 = [saveTimeA1,timeA1]; 
242-                  
243-                 deltaTA = deltaTA; 
244-                 saveDeltaTA = [saveDeltaTA,deltaTA]; 
245-                  
246-             %Type B1 single-AIT failure 
247-             elseif F3<=random3 && random3<F4 
248-                 failB1 = failB1 +1; 
249-                 saveFailB1 = [saveFailB1,failB1]; 
250-                  
251-                 lambdaB1 = lambdaB1*epsilonB1; 
252-                 matLambdaB11 = [matLambdaB11,lambdaB1]; 
253-                  
254-                 timeB11 = timeB11 + 1; 
255-                 saveTimeB11 = [saveTimeB11,timeB11]; 
256-                  
257-                 deltaTB1 = deltaTB1 + 1; 
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258-                 saveDeltaTB1 = [saveDeltaTB1,deltaTB1]; 
259-                  
260-             %Type B2 single-AIT failure 
261-             elseif F4<=random3 && random3<F5 
262-                 failB2 = failB2 + 1; 
263-                 saveFailB2 = [saveFailB2,failB2]; 
264-                  
265-                 lambdaB2 = lambdaB2*epsilonB2; 
266-                 matLambdaB21 = [matLambdaB21,lambdaB2]; 
267-                  
268-                 timeB21 = timeB21 + 8; 
269-                 saveTimeB21 = [saveTimeB21,timeB21]; 
270-                  
271-                 deltaTB2 = deltaTB2 + 8; 
272-                 saveDeltaTB2 = [saveDeltaTB2,deltaTB2]; 
273-                  
274-             %Type B3 single-AIT failure 
275-             elseif F5<=random3 && random3<F6 
276-                 failB3 = failB3 + 1; 
277-                 saveFailB3 = [saveFailB3,failB3]; 
278-                  
279-                 lambdaB3 = lambdaB3*epsilonB3; 
280-                 matLambdaB31 = [matLambdaB31,lambdaB3]; 
281-                  
282-                 timeB31 = timeB31 + 40; 
283-                 saveTimeB31 = [saveTimeB31,timeB31]; 
284-                  
285-                 deltaTB3 = deltaTB3 + 40; 
286-                 saveDeltaTB3 = [saveDeltaTB3,deltaTB3]; 
287-                  
288-             %Type B4 single-AIT failure 
289-             elseif F6<=random3 
290-                 failB4 = failB4 +1; 
291-                 saveFailB4 = [saveFailB4,failB4]; 
292-                  
293-                 lambdaB4 = lambdaB4*epsilonB4; 
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294-                 matLambdaB41 = [matLambdaB41,lambdaB4]; 
295-                  
296-                 timeB41 = timeB41 + 176; 
297-                 saveTimeB41 = [saveTimeB41,timeB41]; 
298-                  
299-                 deltaTB4 = deltaTB4 + 176; 
300-                 saveDeltaTB4 = [saveDeltaTB4,deltaTB4]; 
301-                  
302-             end 
303-                          
304-         %Failure common to any AIT (cross-AIT failure mode) 
305-         elseif F1<=random2 && random2<F2 
306-             saveT3 = [saveT3,Tstep]; 
307-             saveRandom22 = [saveRandom22,random2]; 
308-              
309-             failAITany = failAITany + 1; 
310-             failAITany1 = [failAITany1,failAITany]; 
311-              
312-             lambda0 = lambda0*epsilon0; 
313-             matLambda01 = [matLambda01,lambda0]; 
314-              
315-             Ttot3 = Tstep + deltaTs + deltaTr; 
316-             saveTtot3 = [saveTtot3,Ttot3]; 
317-              
318-             Tstep = Tstep + 1; 
319-              
320-         %Failure is random (random failure mode) 
321-         elseif random2>=F2 
322-             saveT4 = [saveT4,Tstep]; 
323-             saveRandom23 = [saveRandom23,random2]; 
324-              
325-             failRandom = failRandom + 1; 
326-             failRandom1 = [failRandom1,failRandom]; 
327-                       
328-             thetar = thetar*epsilonr; 
329-             matThetar1 = [matThetar1,thetar]; 
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330-              
331-             deltaTr = deltaTr + Tstep; 
332-             saveDeltaTr = [saveDeltaTr,deltaTr]; 
333-              
334-             Ttot4 = Tstep + deltaTs + deltaTr; 
335-             saveTtot4 = [saveTtot4,Ttot4]; 
336-              
337-             Tstep = 0; 
338-         end 
339-          
340-     else 
341-         Tstep = Tstep + 1; 
342-         Tstep1 = [Tstep1,Tstep]; 
343-     end 
344-   
345- end 
346-   
347- allFail = cumFail; 
348- matAllFail = [matAllFail,allFail]; 
349-   
350- allFailSingle = failAITonly; 
351- matAllFailSingle = [matAllFailSingle,allFailSingle]; 
352-   
353- allFailCross = failAITany; 
354- matAllFailCross = [matAllFailCross,allFailCross]; 
355-   
356- allFailRand = failRandom; 
357- matAllFailRand = [matAllFailRand,allFailRand]; 
358-   
359- allFailA = failA; 
360- matAllFailA = [matAllFailA,allFailA]; 
361-   
362- allFailB1 = failB1; 
363- matAllFailB1 = [matAllFailB1,allFailB1]; 
364-   
365- allFailB2 = failB2; 
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366- matAllFailB2 = [matAllFailB2,allFailB2]; 
367-   
368- allFailB3 = failB3; 
369- matAllFailB3 = [matAllFailB3,allFailB3]; 
370-   
371- allFailB4 = failB4; 
372- matAllFailB4 = [matAllFailB4,allFailB4]; 
373-   
374- timeB1 = timeB11; 
375- matTimeB1 = [matTimeB1,timeB1]; 
376-   
377- timeB2 = timeB21; 
378- matTimeB2 = [matTimeB2,timeB2]; 
379-   
380- timeB3 = timeB31; 
381- matTimeB3 = [matTimeB3,timeB3]; 
382-   
383- timeB4 = timeB41; 
384- matTimeB4 = [matTimeB4,timeB4]; 
385-   
386- TAIT = T + deltaTs + deltaTr; %Total testing time for AIT No.1 only 
387- matTAIT = [matTAIT,TAIT]; 
388-   
389- totSingle = timeA1 + timeB11 + timeB21 + timeB31 + timeB41; 
390- matTotSingle = [matTotSingle,totSingle]; 
391-   
392- projectT = T + deltaTs + deltaTr + totSingle; 
393- matProjectT = [matProjectT,projectT]; 
394-   
395- TtAIT = TAIT + TtAIT; %Total testing time of all AIT until AIT No.1 
396- matTtAIT = [matTtAIT,TtAIT]; 
397-   
398- projectTt = TtAIT + deltaTA + deltaTB1 + deltaTB2 + deltaTB3 + deltaTB4; 
399- matProjectTt = [matProjectTt,projectTt]; 
400-   
401- lambda2 = lambda; 
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402- matLambda2 = [matLambda2,lambda2]; 
403-   
404- lambda02 = lambda0; 
405- matLambda02 = [matLambda02,lambda02]; 
406-   
407- lambdaA2 = lambdaA; 
408- matLambdaA2 = [matLambdaA2,lambdaA2]; 
409-   
410- lambdaB12 = lambdaB1; 
411- matLambdaB12 = [matLambdaB12,lambdaB12]; 
412-   
413- lambdaB22 = lambdaB2; 
414- matLambdaB22 = [matLambdaB22,lambdaB22]; 
415-   
416- lambdaB32 = lambdaB3; 
417- matLambdaB32 = [matLambdaB32,lambdaB32]; 
418-   
419- lambdaB42 = lambdaB4; 
420- matLambdaB42 = [matLambdaB42,lambdaB42]; 
421-   
422- thetar2 = thetar; 
423- matThetar2 = [matThetar2,thetar2]; 
424-   
425- N = N + 1; 
426-   
427- end 
428-   
429- meanAllFail = mean(matAllFail); 
430-   
431- meanAllFailSingle = mean(matAllFailSingle); 
432- meanAllFailCross = mean(matAllFailCross); 
433- meanAllFailRand = mean(matAllFailRand); 
434-   
435- meanAllFailA = mean(matAllFailA); 
436- meanAllFailB1 = mean(matAllFailB1); 
437- meanAllFailB2 = mean(matAllFailB2); 
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438- meanAllFailB3 = mean(matAllFailB3); 
439- meanAllFailB4 = mean(matAllFailB4); 
440-   
441- meanTAIT = mean(matTAIT); 
442-   
443- meanTotSingle = mean(matTotSingle); 
444- meanTimeB1 = mean(matTimeB1); 
445- meanTimeB2 = mean(matTimeB2); 
446- meanTimeB3 = mean(matTimeB3); 
447- meanTimeB4 = mean(matTimeB4); 
448-   
449- meanTtAIT = mean(matTtAIT); 
450-   
451- meanProjectT = mean(matProjectT); 
452- meanProjectTt = mean(matProjectTt); 
453-   
454- meanLambda2 = mean(matLambda2); 
455- meanLambda02 = mean(matLambda02); 
456-   
457- meanLambdaA2 = mean(matLambdaA2); 
458- meanLambdaB12 = mean(matLambdaB12); 
459- meanLambdaB22 = mean(matLambdaB22); 
460- meanLambdaB32 = mean(matLambdaB32); 
461- meanLambdaB42 = mean(matLambdaB42); 
462-   
463- meanThetar2 = mean(matThetar2); 
464-   
465- %Write calculations results in Excel 
466- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambda2),M,'A5'); 
467- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambda02),M,'D5'); 
468- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambdaA2),M,'G5'); 
469- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambdaB12),M,'J5'); 
470- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambdaB22),M,'M5'); 
471- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambdaB32),M,'P5'); 
472- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matLambdaB42),M,'S5'); 
473- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matThetar2),M,'V5'); 
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474- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTAIT),M,'Y5'); 
475- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTtAIT),M,'AB5'); 
476- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTotSingle),M,'AE5'); 
477- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTimeB1),M,'AH5'); 
478- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTimeB2),M,'AK5'); 
479- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTimeB3),M,'AN5'); 
480- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matTimeB4),M,'AQ5'); 
481- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matProjectT),M,'AT5'); 
482- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matProjectTt),M,'AW5'); 
483- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFail),M,'AZ5'); 
484- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailSingle),M,'BC5'); 
485- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailCross),M,'BF5'); 
486- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailRand),M,'BI5'); 
487- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailA),M,'BL5'); 
488- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailB1),M,'BO5'); 
489- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailB2),M,'BR5'); 
490- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailB3),M,'BU5'); 
491- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',transpose(matAllFailB4),M,'BX5'); 
492-   
493- %Write average values in Excel 
494- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambda2,M,'B5'); 
495- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambda02,M,'E5'); 
496- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambdaA2,M,'H5'); 
497- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambdaB12,M,'K5'); 
498- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambdaB22,M,'N5'); 
499- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambdaB32,M,'Q5'); 
500- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanLambdaB42,M,'T5'); 
501- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanThetar2,M,'W5'); 
502- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTAIT,M,'Z5'); 
503- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTtAIT,M,'AC5'); 
504- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTotSingle,M,'AF5'); 
505- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTimeB1,M,'AI5'); 
506- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTimeB2,M,'AL5'); 
507- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTimeB3,M,'AO5'); 
508- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanTimeB4,M,'AR5'); 
509- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanProjectT,M,'AU5'); 
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510- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanProjectTt,M,'AX5'); 
511- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFail,M,'BA5'); 
512- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailSingle,M,'BD5'); 
513- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailCross,M,'BG5'); 
514- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailRand,M,'BJ5'); 
515- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailA,M,'BM5'); 
516- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailB1,M,'BP5'); 
517- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailB2,M,'BS5'); 
518- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailB3,M,'BV5'); 
519- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',meanAllFailB4,M,'BY5'); 
520-   
521- %For reliability calculation 
522- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',beta,M,'B1'); 
523-   
524- A = meanLambda02; 
525- B = meanThetar2; 
526- C = meanTtAIT; 
527-   
528- M = M + 1; 
529- end 
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APPENDIX B – MATLAB Program for Reliability Calculation 
1- AIT = 7; 
2- M = AIT; 
3-   
4- lambda0 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',M,'E5'); 
5-   
6- lambda1 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',1,'B5'); 
7- lambda2 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',2,'B5'); 
8- lambda3 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',3,'B5'); 
9- lambda4 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',4,'B5'); 
10- lambda5 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',5,'B5'); 
11- lambda6 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',6,'B5'); 
12- lambda7 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',7,'B5'); 
13-   
14- beta1 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',1,'B1'); 
15- beta2 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',2,'B1'); 
16- beta3 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',3,'B1'); 
17- beta4 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',4,'B1'); 
18- beta5 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',5,'B1'); 
19- beta6 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',6,'B1'); 
20- beta7 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',7,'B1'); 
21-   
22- beta0 = 0.5; 
23-   
24- thetar = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',M,'W5'); 
25-   
26- T = 50000; 
27-   
28- T1 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',1,'Z5'); 
29- T2 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',2,'Z5'); 
30- T3 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',3,'Z5'); 
31- T4 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',4,'Z5'); 
32- T5 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',5,'Z5'); 
33- T6 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',6,'Z5'); 
34- T7 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',7,'Z5'); 
35-   
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36- T0 = xlsread('Cost_1R.xlsx',M,'AC5'); 
37-   
38- matR = []; 
39- matTafter = []; 
40-   
41- for Tafter=0:T 
42-        
43-     R1 = exp(-(lambda1*(Tafter+T1).^beta1)+(lambda1*(T1).^beta1)); 
44-     R2 = exp(-(lambda2*(Tafter+T2).^beta2)+(lambda2*(T2).^beta2)); 
45-     R3 = exp(-(lambda3*(Tafter+T3).^beta3)+(lambda3*(T3).^beta3)); 
46-     R4 = exp(-(lambda4*(Tafter+T4).^beta4)+(lambda4*(T4).^beta4)); 
47-     R5 = exp(-(lambda5*(Tafter+T5).^beta5)+(lambda5*(T5).^beta5)); 
48-     R6 = exp(-(lambda6*(Tafter+T6).^beta6)+(lambda6*(T6).^beta6)); 
49-     R7 = exp(-(lambda7*(Tafter+T7).^beta7)+(lambda7*(T7).^beta7)); 
50-      
51-     Rcross = exp(-(lambda0*(Tafter+T0).^beta0)+(lambda0*(T0).^beta0)); 
52-     Rrandom = exp(-(thetar)*(Tafter)); 
53-   
54-     R = R1*R2*R3*R4*R5*R6*R7*Rcross*Rrandom;  
55-      
56-     matR = [matR,R]; 
57-      
58-     Tafter = Tafter; 
59-     matTafter = [matTafter,Tafter]; 
60-      
61- end 
62-   
63-   
64- x = transpose(matTafter); 
65- y = transpose(matR); 
66-   
67- plot(x,y) 
68-   
69- %To save data to Excel file 
70- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',x,8,'B3'); 
71- xlswrite('Cost_1R.xlsx',y,8,'C3'); 
121 | 148 
APPENDIX C – Data Sets Details of the Total Testing Time, TtAIT, 
Distribution over the 1000 Simulation Runs 
 
C-1. Data set for Ti = 20h 
 
 Mean [h] 235.60 Median [h] 233.89 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 19 168 334 217 77 16 5 7 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 13 7 7 4 8 6 8 5 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 14 9 7 11 10 14 10 4 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 256 259 262 264 268 269 272 287 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 8 5 1 1 2 1 1 1 
 
C-2. Data set for Ti = 50h 
 
 Mean [h] 590.52 Median [h] 585.26 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 583 584 585 587 588 589 590 591 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 21 223 380 32 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 5 2 1 3 5 3 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 609 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 3 2 4 3 3 5 5 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 610 611 612 613 615 616 617 618 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 3 4 4 2 1 4 3 4 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 3 5 7 3 4 5 7 3 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 3 3 8 2 4 5 5 2 
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TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 635 636 637 638 645 654 655 658 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 661 668 669 677 678 683 703 - 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 
 
C-3. Data set for Ti = 100h 
 
 Mean [h] 1133.19 Median [h] 1121.10 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 17 130 403 237 45 3 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1128 1130 1131 1140 1141 1142 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 2 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1143 1144 1145 1146 1148 1149 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 2 1 1 2 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 3 2 3 2 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 3 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 1 1 5 3 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1175 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 2 1 1 3 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 2 3 5 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1182 1183 1187 1188 1189 1190 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 3 2 1 4 2 5 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1191 1192 1193 1195 1197 1198 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 4 3 4 3 4 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 2 3 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1205 1206 1207 1209 1210 1211 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 2 1 4 1 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 
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TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 1 1 1 2 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1218 1219 1221 1222 1225 1226 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 2 2 2 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1228 1230 1240 1248 1251 1252 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1259 1262 1265 1273 1280 1284 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 2 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 1290 1291 1294 1297 1382 - 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 1 - 
 
C-4. Data set for Ti = 200h 
 
 Mean [h] 2166.58 Median [h] 2214.29 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 56 285 358 124 10 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2158 2161 2163 2164 2169 2186 2190 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2191 2193 2194 2200 2203 2204 2205 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2208 2210 2212 2213 2214 2216 2217 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2223 2225 2226 2228 2229 2232 2234 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2235 2237 2239 2240 2241 2243 2244 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 2 1 1 3 2 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2245 2248 2252 2254 2257 2258 2260 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2262 2263 2264 2267 2268 2269 2271 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 1 1 1 1 3 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2272 2273 2274 2275 2278 2279 2280 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 2 1 3 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2281 2284 2285 2286 2287 2289 2291 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 
124 | 148 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2298 2301 2302 2303 2305 2308 2309 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2313 2316 2317 2318 2319 2320 2322 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 3 1 2 2 2 4 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2324 2326 2328 2331 2332 2333 2335 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2336 2337 2338 2339 2341 2342 2343 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 2 4 1 1 3 2 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2344 2349 2354 2363 2371 2379 2380 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2383 2385 2402 2412 2418 2453 2459 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2460 2466 2478 2479 2497 2499 2506 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
TtAIT value during the 1000 runs [h] 2508 2534 - - - - - 
TtAIT occurrence frequency 1 1 - - - - - 
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APPENDIX D – HORYU-IV’s Failures Track Sheet 
 
D-1. Engineering model 1 (EM1) assembly, integration, and testing phase 
 
EM_v1: 2015/02/end - 2015/05/end OBC testing days: 02/24, 25, 27 
System integration starting date: 2015/03/01 EPS testing days: 02/24-27 
Missions integration starting date: 2015/04/09 
COM testing days: 02/24, 26, 28, 
04/13, 21 
  
Failure 
discovery date 
Failure description Failure type Sub-system 
2015/2/24 Share flash to be pulled up 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
" 3-state buffer to be pulled up 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
" OR IC Vcc and GND to be reversed Workmanship OBC 
2015/2/24 Soldering of 2*1Ω resistors 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
2015/2/25 H8 MAIN replaced Workmanship OBC 
" 
Reset from MAIN to COM cannot be 
executed 
Unknown OBC 
2015/2/26 Resistor change from 100Ω to 100kΩ 
Design, 
electronics 
COM 
" CLK delay adjustment Software COM 
" PCB pattern mistake Workmanship EPS 
2015/2/27 Resistors adjustment for X panel 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
" Resistors adjustment for Y panels " " 
" Resistors adjustment for Z panels " " 
" H8 reset not working " " 
" OR IC needs 5V power supply " " 
" TC74VHC125 pins to reverse Workmanship OBC 
" Resistor near share flash to be pulled Design, OBC 
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up electronics 
" Resistors adjustment 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
2015/2/28 CW transmission problem Unknown COM 
" CW cannot be cut, replace PIC Unknown COM 
" HK cannot be received, replace PIC Unknown COM 
" 1200 PTT problem Unknown COM 
" 9600 PTT not working Unknown COM 
" DEMUX removed 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
2015/3/1 
Weak soldering and GND was 
unstable 
Workmanship EPS 
" H8 reset not working Unknown Unknown 
" Satellite reset problem 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
" Resistors value adjustment 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
" 
ADC problem, pull up resistance 
touching another line 
Workmanship OBC 
" Reset Unknown Unknown 
" HK not sent, timing to be adjusted Software COM 
2015/3/2 Resistor/condenser combination 
Design, 
electronics 
Unknown 
" H8 reset problem, made low pass filter Unknown Unknown 
" 
H8 reset problem, 3-state buffer 
connected to 5V 
Unknown Unknown 
" Resistors adjustment for satellite reset Unknown Unknown 
" 
ADC cannot be read, EN and GND 
pins to be reversed 
Workmanship OBC 
" ADC problem Unknown Unknown 
" 
SPI entering H8MAIN and COM to be 
reversed (input/output mistake) 
Workmanship OBC 
2015/3/6 Pins assignment to be modified Software OBC 
2015/3/7 1200 PTT issue Unknown Unknown 
" CW and FM not decoded Software COM 
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" Rx and Tx lines reversed Workmanship COM 
2015/3/9 9600bps problem Unknown Unknown 
2015/3/12 CS pin correction Software OBC 
" 1200bps problem Unknown Unknown 
" 
9600bps problem, change of 
capacitor/resistor combination 
Unknown Unknown 
2015/3/19 
PIC and MODEM CLK need to be 
synchronized 
Software COM 
" Resistors adjustment 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
2015/3/20 Program writing to H8s not working External OBC 
2015/3/23 1200bps problem, MODEM changed Unknown Unknown 
2015/3/27 MUX changed for digital type 
Design, 
electronics 
COM 
2015/3/30 
Flash memory cannot be read, waiting 
time to be adjusted 
Software OBC 
2015/3/31 ADC reading, CS value to be changed Software OBC 
" Program mistake Software OBC 
" Data cannot be decoded Software Unknown 
2015/4/7 OP amp needed 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
2015/4/8 Scramble needed on data Software COM 
" 
Scramble needed not only on data but 
on the whole packet 
" " 
2015/4/9 Transistor from Sband to be removed 
Design, 
electronics 
Sband 
" 
Flash cannot be read when integrated 
with Sband 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface Sband, 
payload 
2015/4/13 SNG problem 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface SNG, 
OBC 
" SNG problem " " 
" HVSA problem 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface HVSA, 
OBC 
2015/4/14 Big problem 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface Big, 
OBC 
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" AODS problem 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface AODS, 
OBC 
2015/04/19, ADC needs to be supplied with 3.3V Workmanship OBC 
" HVSA problem 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface HVSA, 
OBC 
2015/4/21 
Uplink problem,change 
resistor/capacitor 
Design, 
electronics 
COM 
" U/L, decode from GS command Software GS 
2015/4/26 
Diode before each mission MUX 
necessary 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface 
2015/4/27 
Change capacitor between H8 and H8 
reset (1uF -> 10uF) 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
" AODS-CAM problem 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface CAM, 
OBC 
2015/4/29 U/L problem, CS mistake in program Software COM 
" Wrong IRQN connection Workmanship COM 
 
D-2. Engineering model 2 (EM2) assembly, integration, and testing phase 
 
EM_v2: 2015/06/11 - 2015/08/20 Thermal vacuum test 1: 07/11-18 
Integration test 1: 2015/06/11, no failure Thermal vacuum test 2: 08/03-09 
Center box assembly: 2015/06/15-28 Vibrations test: 07/02-04, no failure 
Integration test 2: 2015/06/29-07/10 Shock test: 07/05-06, no failure 
    
Failure 
discovery date 
Failure description Failure type Sub-system 
2015/6/12 Screw problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/13 Screw problem *5 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Cable probem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
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2015/6/14 Screw problem *3 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/15 Screw problem *4 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Hole problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *3 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/16 Screw problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/18 Screw problem *5 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Panel modification *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/21 Screw problem *2 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *3 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/22 Screw problem *2 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/23 Screw problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/25 Screw problem *4 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
" Other problem *3 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/26 Screw problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/6/30 Other problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
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2015/7/2 Screw problem *1 
Design, 
structure 
Structure 
2015/7/10 OBO problem 
Design, 
electronics 
OBO 
2015/7/13 Watch PIC problem Software COM 
2015/7/14 Sband short-circuit Unknown Sband 
2015/7/15 AODS problem Unknown 
Interface AODS, 
OBC 
2015/7/16 CW stopped Software Mother board 
2015/7/17 CW stopped Software Mother board 
2015/7/23 Memory cannot be read 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
2015/7/27 
Over-current protection adjustment 
Sband TX 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
" 
Pull down resitor for PEC mission 
timing 
Design, 
electronics 
Big Apple 
2015/7/28 Comparator adjustment Unknown Unknown 
2015/8/4 CAM problem 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
" 
HVSA, SNG, AVC, Sband 
problem (2V remaining) 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface Sband, 
payload 
" Sband turned ON in 2 steps 
Design, 
electronics 
Unknown 
2015/8/5 SNG problem (busy pin problem) Software 
Interface SNG, 
OBC 
" AVC problem 
Design, 
electronics 
AVC 
2015/8/6 Sband high data loss External Sband 
" Sband problem Unknown Sband 
2015/8/8 Leak from OBC 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
2015/8/13 Leak from Lband Unknown Lband 
 
D-3. Flight model (FM) assembly, integration, and testing phase 
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FM: 2015/08/27 - 2016/01/15 Thermal vacuum test 1: 10/29-30 
Structure assembly: 2015/09/28-10/28 Thermal vacuum test 2: 12/10-11 
Center box assembly: 2015/10/09-10/28 Vibrations test 1: 11/02-03, no failure 
Functional test 1: 08/27-10/28 Vibrations test 2: 12/18, no failure 
Functional test 2: 11/01 Shock test: 11/04, no failure 
Functional test 3: 11/05-06 Shock test Tsukuba: 11/09-12 
Functional test 4: 11/13-12/09 
Plasma test: 12/21-01/04 
(approximation) 
Functional test 5: 12/13-17 Batteries charging: 01/05-08 
 
Delivery: 01/09 
 
Final checks Tsukuba: 01/12-15 
    
Failure 
discovery date 
Failure description Failure type Sub-system 
2015/8/27 GPS plate modification Design, structure AODS 
2015/9/10 OCP problem 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
2015/9/12 
OBO/AVC couldn't acquire data 
during testing 
Unknown OBO, AVC 
2015/9/18 Solar cell broken Workmanship EPS 
2015/9/28 Batteries possible leakage External EPS 
2015/9/28 
Sun sensor boxes to be painted in 
black 
Design, structure AODS 
2015/10/2 
Satellite center box frame design 
mistake 
Design, structure Structure 
2015/10/6 Alodine mistake 
Design, structure + 
workmanship 
Structure 
2015/10/8 Resistances adjustment 1 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
2015/10/8 Resistances adjustment 2 
Design, 
electronics 
EPS 
2015/10/8 Pin assignment error Software OBC 
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2015/10/8 
Through hole position < 1mm from 
GND 
Workmanship EPS 
2015/10/11 AVC male/female connector Design, structure Structure 
2015/10/13 S-band TX External Sband 
2015/10/16 
AODS-CAM lines to exit satellite 
after final closing 
Design, 
electronics 
Interface 
AODS-CAM 
2015/10/17 
S-band busy pin cannot be 
activated by OBC 
Software Sband 
2015/10/21 Sun sensor not fitting well Design, structure 
Interface 
AODS, 
structure 
2015/10/21 Bottom frame holes not aligned External Structure 
2015/10/21 
HVSA L-shape PCB cannot fit 
center box 
Design, structure HVSA 
2015/10/22 
JAXA simplified PAF cannot be 
used 
External Structure 
2015/10/26 
OBC program wrong setting of 
satellite reset pin 
Software OBC 
2015/10/26 Program for D/L Software COM 
2015/10/26 S-band Unknown Sband 
2015/10/28 
OBO and AVC Ch.2 cannot be 
read 
Unknown OBO, AVC 
2015/10/28 
Reset cannot be executed if AODS 
is ON 
Unknown 
Interface OBC, 
AODS 
2015/10/30, 
10:49 
Share flash cannot be read by H8 
MAIN or COM 
Unknown OBC 
2015/10/30, 
11:15 
Infinite reset at low temperature 
Design, 
electronics 
OBC 
2015/11/4 
Kill SW command execution 
problem 
Software OBC 
2015/11/6, 
10:20 
OBC program modification Software OBC 
2015/11/6, 
10:44 
Sat log cmd problem Software COM 
2015/11/6, Cmd reception (HVSA, kill SW, Software COM 
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10:52-11:23 GPS data) problem 
2015/11/6, 
13:36-14:47 
MAIN/COM plugging mistake Workmanship OBC 
2015/11/12 PEEK screw shift Workmanship Structure 
2015/11/23 PEC problem Unknown Big 
2015/11/23 AVC problem Software AVC 
2015/11/23 AVC problem Software AVC 
2015/11/28 HVSA overcurrent problem Workmanship HVSA 
2015/12/7 Interface problem Workmanship EPS 
2015/12/8 
50mm clearance requirement 
between separation surface and 
lowest part of satellite not satisfied 
Workmanship Structure 
2015/12/8, 
11:40 
MAIN reset everytime command 
sent to SNG 
Software 
Interface OBC, 
SNG 
2015/12/8, 
11:50 
SNG cannot read flash memory Unknown 
Interface OBC, 
SNG 
2015/12/8 Sband process problem with AVC Software 
Interface Sband, 
payload 
2015/12/8 Sband data D/L problem with AVC Software 
Interface Sband, 
payload 
2015/12/8 OBC program modification Software OBC 
2015/12/9 L-bank leakage 
Design, 
electronics 
Lband 
2015/12/9, 
19:19 
D/L stopped Software COM 
2015/12/9 Kill SW monitoring Software GS 
2015/12/9 Data not decoded by GS Software GS 
2015/12/9 
Sat. reset not executed through 
Lband 
Unknown 
Interface L, S, 
OBC 
2015/12/9 
Watch PIC reset not executed 
through Lband 
Unknown 
Interface L, S, 
OBC 
2015/12/10, 
10:13 
Command interface problem, when 
AODS ON, HVSA ON too 
Software GS 
2015/12/10, 
10:15 
TX stopped due to HVSA 
oversurrent 
Workmanship 
Interface 
HVSA, COM 
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2015/12/10, 
16:49 
Command for sat. log Software OBC 
2015/12/10 HK data analysis problem Software GS 
2015/12/10 Sensor data D/L problem, H8 reset Software OBC 
2015/12/10 No command acknowledgment Unknown COM 
2015/12/11, 
10:17 
Missing function in GS interface Software GS 
2015/12/11, 
17:11 
Irregular reset Software OBC 
2015/12/13 HVSA problem Unknown HVSA 
2015/12/13 HVSA problem Unknown HVSA 
2015/12/13 AODS data D/L stopped Software COM 
2015/12/14 AODS not turned ON Workmanship AODS 
2015/12/15 AVC problem Unknown AVC 
2015/12/17 OBO trigger not performing Software OBO 
2016/1/2 Missing data from CAM Unknown 
Interface S, 
payload 
2016/1/7 OBC program modification Software OBC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 | 148 
 
APPENDIX E – HORYU-IV’s Lessons Learned 
 
 Team member A Team member B Team member C 
Structure and 
thermal 
・When possible, favor direct connection 
between components instead of using 
connectors 
・To prevent misunderstandings between 
satellite developer and external 
manufacturer, provide simple and imaged 
explanations 
・To prevent mistakes, communication 
between different team members should 
be constant and regular 
・To attach thermal sensors, avoid using 
RTV because it needs to be coupled 
with polyimide tape, which interacts 
with the read value 
- 
Bus sub-systems 
(OBC, COM, 
EPS) 
・To prevent work overload on one team 
member, develop one PCB per 
sub-system 
- - 
Missions ・To prevent work overload on one team 
member, develop one PCB per 
sub-system 
・Number of missions should be 
minimized 
・Main mission should be transparent on 
its progress since lack of transparency 
can affect the whole satellite 
architecture and schedule 
- 
Interfaces 
- 
・Proper project management is 
necessary to ensure all different parts 
- 
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can properly move as one system, not as 
an assembly of systems 
Ground station 
- 
・All members should know how to 
operate ground station to facilitate 
on-orbit operations 
- 
Team ・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid 
team members turn over during project 
・For a forward moving project, ensure 
team unity through non-project related 
activities 
・International team helps understand 
different ways of thinking and overall 
helps an individual to grow 
・There should be at least one person who 
understands the whole satellite at its 
technical level to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid 
team members turn over during project 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid 
team members turn over during project 
・For a forward moving project, ensure 
team unity through non-project related 
activities 
・International team helps understand 
different ways of thinking and overall 
helps an individual to grow 
・There should be at least one person who 
understands the whole satellite at its 
technical level to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition 
・There should be at least one person able 
to guide and explain logic of 
decision-making and processes 
Project ・To prevent emails misunderstanding, 
favor local manufacturers to be able to 
interact directly face-to-face 
・Each team should have a responsible 
leader to prevent project manager work 
overload in addition to managing 
・No excuse should be accepted to ensure 
deadlines are satisfied 
・Prepare long term schedule, including 
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・Through multiple mission types and 
inherent satellite complexity, knowledge 
can be improved in various fields 
development steps and tests, to visualize 
the impact of a delay on the overall 
project 
・Weekly meetings are necessary to share 
progress, ideas for improvement, and 
problems 
・To prevent mistakes, constantly and 
regularly revise requirements allocation 
sheet 
・To prevent misunderstandings, always 
ask questions and confirm what you think 
is obvious 
・Breakdown of each team member roles 
and responsibilities is necessary 
Resources ・To prevent time and money loss, 
organize tools in an easy and proper 
manner 
・Proper software should be acquired to 
prevent schedule conflict when have to 
borrow from other laboratories 
- 
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 Team member D Team member E Team member F 
Structure and 
thermal 
・When possible, mount as many as 
possible temperature sensors on the 
different sub-systems 
・When designing structure, always keep 
in mind how to improve it for easy 
assembly/desassembly and tests 
compatibility 
・When possible, mount as many as 
possible temperature sensors on the 
different sub-systems 
- 
Bus sub-systems 
(OBC, COM, 
EPS) 
- 
・To reduce harness and facilitate testing 
good to have several sub-systems 
integrated on one PCB 
・To facilitate testing in parallel and to 
prevent work overload on one team 
member, develop one PCB per sub-system 
・Always include level converter for SPI 
line 
・Use past projects’ developed bus system 
to facilitate development and launcher 
safety coordination 
・To prevent leakage from one sub-system 
to another, use ADCs with backflow 
prevention diodes 
・To prevent erasing all data of a flash 
・Reset should be on power line directly 
not on OBC power line 
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memory when overwriting, use FRAM or 
EEPROM type memory 
・Minimize the number of reset types 
・Minimize the number of communication 
systems 
・To facilitate signal reception on bus side, 
ensure high impedance when the signal 
goes from a sub-system to the bus 
・To prevent surge, mount coils 
・To facilitate development and being able 
to focus on payload and interfaces only, 
order already made bus sub-systems 
・OBC program requires constant 
modifications so the person in charge 
should be an internal member of the entity 
developing the satellite, not external 
・When possible, OBC hardware and 
software developers should be the same 
person 
Missions 
- 
・To reduce harness and facilitate testing 
good to have several sub-systems 
integrated on one PCB 
・Always include level converter for SPI 
・Developing sub-systems in-house favors 
learning-by-doing 
・Quadrant photodiodes are easy to use, 
but they have low FOV 
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line 
・To prevent erasing all data of a flash 
memory when overwriting, use FRAM or 
EEPROM type memory 
・To facilitate signal reception on bus side, 
ensure high impedance when the signal 
goes from a sub-system to the bus 
・COTS gyro can be very noisy and lack 
of accuracy 
・Should have considered turning ON 
PEC mission without information from 
sun sensors 
Interfaces ・End-to-end test should be carried out 
thoroughly for each mode and this can 
take a non-negligible time to be 
accounted for in the project schedule 
・Useful to have different interfaces 
connected through connectors for easy 
plug-in/plug-out 
・OBC should include all the digital data, 
while analog data such as transponder and 
sensors should be external to OBC 
- 
Ground station 
- - 
・Automate S-band GS data reception and 
data analysis 
Team ・For a forward moving project, ensure 
team unity through non-project related 
activities 
・There should be at least one person 
who understands the whole satellite at 
its technical level to facilitate 
knowledge acquisition 
・For each sub-system, define one 
responsible 
・There should be at least one person who 
understands the whole satellite at its 
technical level to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition 
・OBC program requires constant 
modifications so the person in charge 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid 
team members turn over during project 
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should be an internal member to the entity 
developing the satellite, not external 
・When possible, OBC hardware and 
software developers should be the same 
person 
Project ・Prepare long term schedule, including 
development steps and tests, to 
visualize the impact of a delay on the 
overall project 
・Weekly meetings are necessary to 
share progress, ideas for improvement, 
and problems 
・To prevent mistakes, ensure proper 
knowledge transfer, and ensure proper 
verifications, documentation creation 
and maintenance throughout the whole 
project is necessary  
・Breakdown of each team member roles 
and responsibilities is necessary 
・Breakdown of each team member roles 
and responsibilities is necessary 
・Weekly meetings are necessary to share 
progress, ideas for improvement, and 
problems 
・Prepare long term schedule, including 
development steps and tests, to visualize 
the impact of a delay on the overall 
project 
・To prevent mistakes, ensure proper 
knowledge transfer, and ensure proper 
verifications, documentation creation and 
maintenance throughout the whole project 
is necessary 
Facilities 
- 
・When possible, have testing facilities 
where the satellite is developed to 
facilitate schedules coordination and 
minimize waste of time and money 
- 
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Resources ・To prevent time and money loss, 
organize tools in an easy and proper 
manner 
・To prevent time and money loss, 
organize electronic parts in an easy and 
proper manner 
・Parts procurement should be managed by 
one person 
- 
Improvement 
ideas 
- - 
・For AODS, instead of information 
coming from the solar panels, use coarse 
(3 needed) or fine sun sensors (6 needed) 
・Increase number of permanent magnets 
to fasten satellite stabilization 
Others ・When students are involved, satellite 
project should match graduation thesis 
themes 
・Through international satellite project, 
can learn practical systems engineering 
and improve skills in various 
engineering and other fields 
- 
・GPS test should be sufficiently 
performed outside when there is clear 
view 
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 Team member G Team member H Team member I 
Structure and 
thermal - - 
・Always take into account harness and its 
interaction with the other structural and 
electrical elements 
Bus sub-systems 
(OBC, COM, 
EPS) 
- - 
・OBC program requires constant 
modifications so the person in charge 
should be an internal member of the entity 
developing the satellite, not external 
Missions 
- 
・Have one micro-controller per 
mission 
・To improve efficiency and satellite 
quality, main mission should be integrated 
with other sub-systems as early as possible 
Interfaces 
- 
・All team members should 
understand interfaces 
・Integration tests should be started as early 
as possible 
Ground station 
- - 
・GS software should be started as early as 
possible and by the time the space segment 
development reached FM, GS software 
sould be 80% complete 
・GS is an integral part of satellite project 
and should be considered as important as 
space segment development 
・Have a central server to easen 
information exchange with amateur radio 
community 
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Team ・There should be at least one person who 
understands the whole satellite at its technical 
level to facilitate knowledge acquisition 
・To improve knowledge transfer, include all 
members of one sub-system in the 
conversation 
・To facilitate communication, 
information dissemination, and 
verifications, all team members 
should be gathered in one room 
・The number of members to be accepted 
for a project should be limited depending 
on the project complexity 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid team 
members turn over during project 
・To facilitate communication, information 
dissemination, and verifications, all team 
members should be gathered in one room 
Project ・Weekly meetings are necessary to share 
progress, ideas for improvement, and 
problems 
・To prevent mistakes, ensure proper 
knowledge transfer, and ensure proper 
verifications, documentation creation and 
maintenance throughout the whole project is 
necessary 
・In students satellite projects, design 
decisions, within certain limits, should be 
driven by the students, not the professors 
・To prevent misunderstandings, always ask 
questions and confirm what you think is 
obvious 
・Whenever possible, do work in 
parallel 
・Breakdown of each team member 
roles and responsibilities is 
necessary 
・Weekly meetings are necessary to 
share progress, ideas for 
improvement, and problems 
・Prepare long term schedule, 
including development steps and 
tests, to visualize the impact of a 
delay on the overall project 
・To prevent mistakes, ensure proper 
knowledge transfer, and ensure proper 
verifications, documentation creation and 
maintenance throughout the whole project 
is necessary 
Resources ・Ensure financial support as early and fast as - ・Parts procurement should be managed by 
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possible one person 
Improvement 
ideas 
・For international projects, define core 
working time to prevent schedules 
coordination issues between different work 
cultures 
- 
・When it is identified team members 
cannot perform task (programming, 
electrical circuit designing, others) held 
training sessions during BBM 
Others ・When students are involved, satellite project 
should match graduation thesis themes 
・When students are involved, 
satellite project should match 
graduation thesis themes 
・To keep motivation high after satellite 
launch, write peer-reviewed papers from 
on-orbit results 
・All information should be properly 
documented and open to all team 
members, no secret should be accepted 
・As much as possible. do testing as you fly 
prior to satellite delivery 
・For data and knowledge exchange, join 
network of satellite projects such as 
UNISEC 
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 Team member J Team member K Team member L 
Bus sub-systems 
(OBC, COM, 
EPS) 
- - 
・Improve efficiency by replacing old 
micro-controllers used in OBC and AODS 
Missions ・Do by yourself as much as possible 
to broaden skills and knowledge 
- - 
Ground station ・All members should know how to 
operate ground station to facilitate 
on-orbit operations 
・Have a central server to easen 
information exchange with amateur radio 
community 
- 
Team ・The number of members to be 
accepted for a project should be 
limited depending on the project 
complexity 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, 
avoid team members turn over 
during project 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid 
team members turn over during project 
・Everybody should be held responsible, 
no excuse should be accepted 
・For a forward moving project, ensure 
team unity through non-project related 
activities 
・To prevent loss of knowledge, avoid team 
members turn over during project 
・International team helps understand 
different ways of thinking and overall helps 
an individual to grow 
・There should be at least one person who 
understands the whole satellite at its 
technical level to facilitate knowledge 
acquisition 
・For a forward moving project, ensure team 
unity through non-project related activities 
Project ・Space engineering using hands-on 
activities through a satellite project 
helps improve understanding of the 
・To prevent mistakes, ensure proper 
knowledge transfer, and ensure proper 
verifications, documentation creation and 
・For international projects, ensure all 
necessary and relevant documentation is in 
English to facilitate and enhance knowledge 
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theory taught during classes maintenance throughout the whole 
project is necessary 
・When project manager is not a student, 
consider having a student as sub-PM for 
him/her to understand satellite project 
management 
・Prepare long term schedule, including 
development steps and tests, to visualize 
the impact of a delay on the overall 
project 
transfer 
・Weekly meetings are necessary to share 
progress, ideas for improvement, and 
problems 
・To prevent mistakes, ensure proper 
knowledge transfer, and ensure proper 
verifications, documentation creation and 
maintenance throughout the whole project is 
necessary 
Facilities 
- - 
・Ensure each function (ex.: soldering, 
assembly, functional test, others) has its 
dedicated location to prevent equipment 
mobility and loss 
Resources 
- - 
・To prevent time and money loss, organize 
tools in an easy and proper manner 
・To prevent time and money loss, organize 
electronic parts in an easy and proper 
manner 
Improvement 
ideas 
- - 
・To improve satellite overall efficiency and 
capability, implement step-by-step newer 
technology as back-up of a sub-system (ex.: 
micro-controller, integrated switches, 
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others) 
・Have re-work station to easily remove ICs 
and do corrections on PCB when needed 
Others ・Do testing including margins to 
investigate possible on-ground/space 
results differences prior to satellite 
launch 
・Through international satellite 
project, can learn practical systems 
engineering and improve skills in 
various engineering and other fields 
・Have a central, well-managed database 
where all information relevant to the 
project can easily be accessible 
・All information should be properly 
documented and open to all team 
members, no secret should be accepted 
・Keep website active and updated 
・As much as possible. do testing as you 
fly prior to satellite delivery 
・Have a central, well-managed database 
where all information relevant to the project 
can easily be accessible 
・All information should be properly 
documented and open to all team members, 
no secret should be accepted 
 
